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UNMASKING THE "MATCHING PRINCIPLE"
IN TAX LAW
Julie A. Roin *
INTRODUTION
XItr are accustomed to believing that a taxpayer's treatment of one
transaction may determine the tax consequences of a later,
related transaction. For example, the amount of gain a taxpayer rec-
ognizes upon the disposition of an asset depends on the circumstances
under which the taxpayer acquired the asset and, in particular, on the
basis created as a result of that acquisition.I We are much less accus-
tomed to believing that the tax consequences of a transaction should
be determined by another taxpayer's treatment of the transaction.
Most commentators are willing to acknowledge that "Congress is free
to enact-and should enact-rules to the effect that the tax treatment
of one party is in fact keyed to that of another in particular types of
transactions." 2 But most resist the uniform application of a "'com-
mon law' income-tax principle holding that the tax treatment of one
taxpayer determines the tax treatment of another."'3
* Class of 1963 Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School. I am
grateful to Hugh Ault, Saul Levmore, and participants in the 1991 Harvard Seminar on
Current Research in Taxation for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I
would also like thank the University of Virginia Law School Foundation for its generous
financial support.
I See I.R.C. § 1001 (1988) (defining gain from the disposition of property as "the excess of
the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining
gain").
2 Joseph M. Dodge, The Logic of Tax: Federal Income Tax Theory and Policy 102 (1989)
(emphasis added). The Code mandates consistency between taxpayers in a number of specific
situations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 71(a) (1988) (requiring inclusion of alimony payments in gross
income of payee); id. § 215(a) (allowing payor a deduction for alimony payments); id. § 102(a)
(excluding gifts from income); id. § 274(b)(1) (limiting deduction for business gifts to $25 per
recipient); id. § 163(e)(1) (allowing issuer a deduction for original issue discount over life of
bond); id. § 1272(a) (establishing schedule for inclusion of original issue discount in income of
holder).
3 Dodge, supra note 2, at 102; see id. (asserting that mandatory joinder is unworkable
because there are "too many parties to too many transactions involving too many taxable years
for such a system to work"); Cheryl D. Block, The Trouble With Interest: Reflections on
Interest Deductions After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 689, 700 n.34
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Such opposition is understandable; it is often difficult to join all
parties to a transaction for purposes of determining each one's tax
liability. Moreover, requiring an absolute matching of tax conse-
quences in all circumstances would conflict with basic features of our
current income tax system, such as the co-existence of different
accounting systems and the maintenance of multiple, progressive rate
schedules. Yet the fact that such a principle cannot be fully imple-
mented in all cases does not mean that examining tax rules for com-
pliance with such a standard is a useless exercise.
In this Article, I argue that "systemic matching"-that is, relating
the tax treatment of various parties in a given transaction to each
other's tax treatment-should in fact be a basic tool of tax policy
analysis. Though the process of matching is no panacea for all of the
ills of the tax system, it can advance tax policy goals by isolating
problems and the causes of perceived problems. Once isolated, these
situations can either be solved or accepted as inevitable side-effects of
some other tax policy decisions. Even more important, the failure to
match often leads to the mistaken adoption of false solutions to non-
problems, creating undesirable economic distortions.
Perhaps the easiest way to think about the matching principle is to
regard it as a systemic tax benefit rule. Whereas the familiar, or
"real," tax benefit rule enforces consistency in one taxpayer's treat-
ment of a transaction over several years,4 the systemic tax benefit rule,
or matching principle, aims for consistency in treatment of different
taxpayers involved in a transaction. The combined tax effects of the
transaction on such taxpayers are examined for conformity with the
appropriate pattern of taxation. Because inconsistencies identified
through the matching process signal the existence of a relative tax
advantage or an opportunity for arbitrage, the presence of inconsis-
(1988) ("The statement in the text should not be taken to suggest that symmetrical treatment
of opposite sides of a transaction should always be required."). But cf. Daniel I. Halperin,
Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 Yale L.. 506, 508 (1986) (arguing
that the proper approach to these problems is "to account explicitly for the investment income
from what may often be described as disguised loans").
4 Though a complete exegesis of the tax benefit rule is beyond the scope of this Article, in
general the rule serves to create a balancing entry in a taxpayer's income calculation when
necessary to overcome distortions engendered by the annual accounting principle. The rule
thus ensures that a given taxpayer neither omits nor counts twice income items affected by
transactions taking place in two different taxable years. See 1 Boris I. Bittker, Federal
Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 5.7.1 (1981).
[Vol. 79:813
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tencies requires explanation, if not correction. This exercise attempts
to ensure that no income item or deduction is overlooked, inadver-
tently "drops out" of the tax system, or is accidentally included more
frequently than it should be.
For example, Congress deliberately created a mismatch by exclud-
ing the value of employer-provided accident and health insurance
from employees' income pursuant to § 106 of the Code.' The
employer's cost of providing such insurance, like other wage expendi-
tures, is properly deductible as a business expense under § 162. In the
normal course, however, this deduction would be matched by inclu-
sion in the employee's taxable income. Section 106 eliminates this
match, thereby promoting the payment of wages in the form of health
insurance rather than cash.6 Policymakers are currently debating the
effects of this mismatch and reexamining whether its benefits justify
its costs.7
Part I further explains the matching principle by applying it to sev-
eral simple transactions. Part II applies the matching principle to
more complicated transactions that are often said to provide taxpay-
ers with unreasonable tax advantages. Specifically, the analysis
focuses on leveraged business entities and the ability of taxpayers to
deduct interest expenses even when the corresponding interest income
is earned by tax-exempt organizations, such as charities and pension
funds. In Part III, the discussion returns to a less global matching
5 Unless otherwise stated, all references to "the Code" contained herein are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, codified at 26 U.S.C. [I.R.C.] §§ 1-9602 (1988 & Supp. II
1990).
6 The same results could be achieved, of course, by allowing taxpayers to deduct the cost of
purchasing health and accident insurance for themselves and their families. There would
again be a mismatch; this time, though, it would consist of treating a consumption expenditure
as a business expense. In fact, the Code provides for this alternative treatment in certain
circumstances. See I.R.C. § 162(1) (1988) (allowing self-employed individuals to deduct 25%
of the cost of purchasing health insurance for themselves and dependents); id. § 213(a)
(allowing itemizing individuals to deduct medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross
income).
7 President Clinton has considered proposals to tax employer-paid health insurance in order
to curb the spiraling health costs that may be partially attributable to this subsidy. See Susan
Dentzer, Clinton's Taxing Health Reform, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 18, 1993, at 66. In
addition, though few dispute the desirability of widespread health insurance coverage, which
the mismatch encourages, a number of commentators have questioned whether the current set
of tax incentives is the most cost-effective method of achieving that end. See, e.g., 2
Department of the Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 23-
24 (1984).
1993]
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problem that the Supreme Court recently addressed in a case involv-
ing the deductibility of parental payments to children undertaking
missionary work. In each of these contexts, the matching principle
provides a novel method for evaluating transactions and suggests
reforms different from those contemplated by Congress, courts, and
commentators.
I. THE MATCHING PRINCIPLE
This Part further explains the matching principle by drawing atten-
tion to the distinction between the tax treatment of business and con-
sumption transactions, and with this distinction in mind, it explores
the application of the matching principle to business gifts and to tax-
payers who find and lose property. Analyzing the matching principle
in these rather mundane contexts will prepare the reader for the more
complicated applications in Parts II and III.
A. Business Versus Consumption Transactions
The existence of two traditional patterns of taxation makes imple-
mentation of the matching principle more difficult. The first pattern
generally applies to business transactions, the second to consumption
transactions. Consistency depends upon whether the combined tax
consequences of a transaction fit within both an accepted and appro-
priate pattern of taxation. Therefore, one must determine whether
the transaction should properly be viewed as a consumption or busi-
ness transaction. Unfortunately, the line between the two categories
of transactions is not always clear.
In business transactions, application of the matching principle
requires that when one taxpayer takes a deduction, another must
include the deducted amount in its income. For example, if a
merchant hires a painter to paint her store for $500, the merchant is
entitled to deduct the $500 as a business expense,' whereas the painter
8 See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988). The only possible glitch is if the cost of painting is treated as a
capital expense. See id. § 263(a) (disallowing deductions for capital expenditures). Even in
that event, however, the merchant will eventually be entitled to deduct the painting expense in
the form of a depreciation deduction, see id. § 167, or as a reduction of gain upon sale of the
building, see id. § 1011(a). Thus, the matching will take place, albeit after a time lag.
816 [Vol. 79:813
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must ordinarily include the $500 in income.9 In short, a tax liability
for one party in the system should lead to an offsetting1" tax "advan-
tage" for someone else in the system. Under this pattern, and disre-
garding for the moment the complexity added by the two-tier tax on
corporate profits, business income is taxed once and only once, no
matter how many hands it passes through. One might think of this
pattern as looking for the income added at each stage of the produc-
tion process.
The pattern for consumption transactions-where one party incurs
what would be described in the Code as a "personal, living, or family
expense[ ]"1--differs from that established for business transactions.
In consumption transactions, income is included in the tax base
twice-in the hands of both the payor and the payee. For example, if
I hire a painter to paint my house for $500, the painter must include
the $500 in income12 although I receive no deduction for my $500
expenditure.1 3 Thus, the $500 is, in a sense, included in my income as
well.14 Another way of looking at the prevailing pattern for consump-
tion transactions is to view it as an unfavorable variation of the busi-
ness pattern.'5 When my painter and I finish paying our taxes, we
9 The painter may have business expenditures that reduce his taxable income. Because
those expenditures in turn create income for someone else, no income drops out of the system,
and it is accurate to say that all $500 paid to the painter is included in someone's income.
10 In a system with progressive rate schedules, it is unrealistic to expect that a tax
disadvantage to one party will always generate an equal tax advantage to another party.
However, to satisfy the matching principle, mismatches in tax rates and timing of inclusions
and deductions must be explained or justified to be acceptable.
11 I.R.C. § 262(a) (1988).
12 See id. § 61(a)(1) (defining income as "[clompensation for services").
13 See id. § 262(a) (providing that "no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses"). The only exception may be if the expenditure were incurred immediately
prior to placing the house on the market, in which case it might be counted as an expense of
the sale, reducing any profit gained therefrom. But such cases are more properly considered as
business expenditures. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1034-1(b)(6) (as amended in 1979) (defining
"fixing-up expenses" deductible from gain on sale of personal residence).
14 That is, it is included in my taxable income in the year that I receive it, unless it is
received in a tax-exempt fashion. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (1988) (exempting gifts and bequests
from gross income). In that case, one might argue that the taxation of the original earner of
the income "substitutes" for my taxation. One could just as plausibly argue that the failure to
tax the transfer to me makes such transfers a tax preferred consumption item for the
transferor, thus necessitating a justification for the preference.
Is Indeed, from this perspective, the disadvantaged tax treatment accorded consumption
transactions overcomes the generally perceived bias in the tax system towards consumption-
the so-called "double tax on savings." See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1168-69 (1974); Department of the
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will retain less money than the merchant and her painter, and the
government will have more.
Generally speaking, a transaction that generates tax consequences
that differ from these normal patterns will become more or less likely
to take place depending upon whether the taxpayers engaging in the
transaction benefit from the mismatch. Imagine, for example, that I
am trying to decide whether to spend $500 on a new couch or on a
painter who will work on my house. Both projects are worth about
the same amount to me-that is, I subjectively value the paint job
about as highly as I value the new couch. If Congress decided that
house-painting, unlike most other forms of personal consumption,
should be a deductible expense, I would be more likely to hire the
painter than to purchase a $500 couch. After all, the after-tax cost of
the paint job to me will be only $335,16 whereas the after-tax cost of
the couch will be $500.17 These deviations from the normal pattern
have predictable behavioral effects. The deviations will be justified if
these effects are desirable, but correction will be required if they are
not. Application of the matching principle identifies such mis-
matches, thereby identifying areas of tax law that require exploration,
if not always correction.
B. Business Gifts
The case of business gifts provides an example of an unintended
mismatch that required correction. Section 102 of the Code, which
exempts gifts from recipients' income, has long been a part of tax
law."8 Taxpayers quickly learned to combine the generosity of this
Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 50-51 (1977); see also Paul Craig Roberts, The
U.S. Supply-Side Revolution, in Tax Policy in the Twenty-First Century 221, 226-27 (Herbert
Stein ed., 1988) (decrying bias against savings due to "multiple taxation of saving[s]"). But
see, e.g., James M. Bickley, The Value-Added Tax: Concepts, Issues, and Experience, 47 Tax
Notes 447, 456 (1990) (stating that income effect of consumption tax would offset higher rate
of return on savings).
16 Assuming a 33% marginal tax rate, the after tax cost of a $500 paint job is $500 minus
(.33 x 500), or $335.
17 This is true as long as the intent is to leave the couch vendor in the same position as the
painter, with $500 in taxable pre-tax income.
I8 I.R.C. § 102 (1988). Indeed, "[t]he exclusion of property acquired by gift from gross
income under the federal income tax laws was made in the first income tax statute passed
under the authority of the Sixteenth Amendment, and has been a feature of the income tax
statutes ever since." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960). A good
argument exists for claiming that § 102 violates the matching principle even in its least
[Vol. 79:813
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provision with the deductibility of business expenditures. That is,
employers began to deduct as a business expense the cost of transfers
made in the context of a business but outside of an explicit quid pro
quo bargain exchange. This combination of provisions caused the
transferred amount to drop out of the tax system entirely, thereby
improving on the tax treatment generally accorded to business
expenditures.
In the most famous of these cases, Commissioner v. Duberstein,19 a
businessman bestowed a Cadillac on another business executive who
had supplied information regarding potential customers.20 The two
businessmen never had an explicit agreement regarding compensation
for the information. Indeed, the recipient claimed that he had never
expected to receive any compensation and at first declined the car.21
The transferor deducted the cost of the Cadillac as a business
expense,22 and the question raised in the case was whether the trans-
feree could exclude the value of the Cadillac from income as a gift
under § 102 of the Code.23 The Supreme Court decided the case
against the taxpayer-transferee, finding that the transfer at issue did
not meet the standard of "detached and disinterested generosity"
required of gifts.24 The Court, however, explicitly rejected the conten-
tion that gift treatment for a recipient was inconsistent with a trans-
feror's treatment of the transfer as an "ordinary and necessary"
business expense, eligible for a business deduction.25
problematic context, intrafamily gifts. After all, one can easily contend that the transfer of
money to an object of natural bounty and affection is a form of consumption, so that the
transferred amount should be included in the income of both the transferor when earned and
the transferee when received. See Dodge, supra note 2, at 103; Henry C. Simons, Personal
Income Taxation 56-58 (1938). However, the provision eliminates the need to deal with what
would otherwise be a thorny administrative tangle-the separation of "gifts" from ordinary,
intrafamily "support," which should be nontaxable as long as the family is considered to
constitute one taxable unit. See Dodge, supra note 2, at 103. But see Boris I. Bittker, A
"Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 946
(1967) (arguing that such concerns "are no more self-evident or compelling. . . than the
reasons that led Congress to enact many of the other 'preferences' of existing law").
19 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
20 Id. at 280-81.
21 Id. at 280.
22 Id. at 281.
23 Id. at 279-80.
24 Id. at 285, 291-92.
25 Id. at 287-88.
1993]
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Subsequent taxpayers frequently failed in their attempts to gain
favorable treatment because of their inability to prove "detached and
disinterested generosity. ' '26 Enough of these transactions took place,
however, to prompt congressional action. Its first response, in 1962,
was to limit the deduction for business gifts to $25 per recipient per
year,27 while providing a slightly more generous limitation for
employee awards.2 s As a result, gifts effectively became includable in
the hands of the transferor rather than the transferee. In essence, a
substitute tax was levied to eliminate the mismatch. Although this
reform was successful in ensuring that most business gifts would be
subjected to one level of tax, in the same manner as other business
expenditures, it ultimately proved unsatisfactory because it allowed
employers and employees to engage in rate arbitrage. That is,
employers and employees structured their transfers to insure the
income's taxation in the hands of the taxpayer facing the lowest mar-
ginal rate.2 9 Furthermore, disallowing the employer's deduction had
no effect on employers who, for one reason or another, would not
have been entitled to claim a deduction for the gift in any case. 0
26 See, e.g., Russek v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 123 (1961).
27 See I.R.C. § 274(b) (1988). This provision has been revised numerous times since its
original enactment in 1962 as part of Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 974. See I.R.C. § 274(o)
(1988).
28 For the current version of this provision, see id. § 274(j)(2).
29 Generally speaking, it made sense to structure a transfer as a gift if the employer's tax
rate was lower than the employee's and as salary if the employer's tax rate was higher than the
employee's, as the following numerical example shows. Case 1 compares the employer's after-
tax costs of a $1000 salary payment and a gift calculated to give the same after-tax employee
benefit as $1000 in salary when the employer's marginal tax rate is 34% and the employee's is
28%. Case 2 compares the same costs when the employer's marginal tax rate is 28% and the
employee's is 34%. In Case 1, providing compensation in the form of salary is cheaper,
whereas providing it in the form of a gift is cheaper in Case 2.
Case 1
Form of Transfer Benefit to Employee Cost to Employer
Salary ($1000) $720 $660
Gift ($720) $720 $711.50
Case 2
Form of Transfer Benefit to Employee Cost to Employer
Salary ($1000) $660 $720
Gift ($660) $660 $653
30 Such employers included both tax-exempt organizations and nonbusiness employers. In
both cases, § 274(b) would fail to increase the employer's tax obligation on account of a gift,
making the decision to avoid the employee-level tax costless and, hence, profitable.
820
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Congress attempted to eliminate these remaining problems by
adding § 102(c) to the Code in 1986. This provision disqualifies trans-
fers "by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee"
from the exclusion from gross income allowed by § 102(a). Thus,
most transfers from employers to employees no longer qualify as gifts
for tax purposes, and they must be included in the gross income of
employees as if they were transfers explicitly labeled as wages.3' In
sum, the history of legislation in the area of business gifts has been
one of slow but steady drift towards implementation of the matching
principle.
Although Congress has made great progress, some holes remain in
the legislative scheme. Because § 102(c) applies only to transfers
between employees and employers, taxpayers can continue to engage
in rate arbitrage games in other transfers, such as those involving
independent contractors and customers. Even in the employer-
employee context, an exception to the general inclusionary rules con-
tinues to exist for certain employee achievement awards. Awards
meeting detailed statutory criteria3 2 are both excludable from the
income of employees33 and deductible as business expenses by
employers.34 Further, some employer gifts presumably remain
excludable from employees' income as de minimis fringe benefits.35
Thus, the ghost of Duberstein continues to haunt the halls of the
Treasury. Nevertheless, the matching principle proves relatively easy
to enforce in the business gift context. The compensatory nature of
most such transfers is easy to discern, and the lack of social utility in
structuring such transfers as "gifts" is equally obvious.
31 This generally does not lead to the double taxation of ostensible "employee gifts" because
the § 274(b) limitation on the employer's deduction applies only to gifts "excludable from
gross income of the recipient under section 102." I.R.C. § 274(b) (1988). Section 274(b)'s
deduction limitation thus would not apply to transfers deemed includable in the recipients'
income as a result of § 102(c). Of course, if the employment relationship itself is considered a
form of consumption by the employer-domestic help, or a personal trainer, for example-
rather than a business expenditure, § 102(c) has the effect of restoring the double taxation
appropriate to all consumption expenditures.
32 See I.R.C. § 274(j) (1988).
33 Id. § 74(c).
34 Id. § 274(j)(1).
35 See id. § 132(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (1989) (excluding "traditional birthday or
holiday gifts of property (not cash) with a low fair market value; occasional theater or sporting
event tickets... and flowers, fruit, books, or similar property provided to employees under
special circumstances (e.g., on account of illness, outstanding performance, or family crisis)").
19931
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C. Finders and Losers
In other situations, however, the application of the matching prin-
ciple is more difficult. For example, suppose Jane loses a $20 bill
while walking down the street, and Mary comes along and picks it up.
Not knowing or not caring who lost the bill, Mary keeps it. Theoreti-
cally, Mary is supposed to include the $20 in income for tax pur-
poses, 36 whereas Jane may not deduct her loss. 3 7 Thus a mismatch
exists (double inclusion), and the normal pattern for taxing noncon-
sumptive transactions is violated. Several arguments suggest, how-
ever, that this mismatch ought not to be regarded as a violation of the
matching principle.
The apparent double taxation can be thought of as taxation on the
"wrong" taxpayer, as occurred under § 274(b). Few people in Mary's
position report such windfall gains, so Jane's taxation, through the
denial of a deduction for her loss, can be viewed as a substitute for the
preferred and justifiable taxation of Mary. 8 Moreover, we might be
suspicious of a deduction by Jane for "missing" money because such a
claim is difficult to verify. The denial of Jane's deduction may simply
express the concern that Mary does not exist or, at least, cannot be
found and taxed.
Alternatively, one might argue that no mismatch exists because the
transaction is more properly classified as a consumption transaction
rather than a business transaction. Taxation of both Jane and Mary is
36 Windfalls are includable in gross income as defined in § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.
See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
37 See I.R.C. § 165(c) (1988) (stating that individuals are allowed to deduct only those
losses incurred in a trade or business, in a transaction entered into for profit, or resulting from
fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or theft); id. § 165(h)(1) (permitting casualty loss
deduction only to the extent that the loss arising from the casualty exceeds $100).
38 Substitute taxation as a partial solution to violations of the matching principle has been
previously discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31 (discussing I.R.C. § 274(b)
(1988)). The use of substitute taxation here is again somewhat problematic, though for a
different reason. If the taxation of Jane is truly intended as substitute taxation, one would
expect Mary to be relieved of her obligation to pay tax on the income. Providing such relief
would not only reduce the number of technical violators of the tax code, who might then
sympathize with other, less trivial violators, but also would avoid penalizing honesty. On the
other hand, because business taxpayers probably can deduct such losses, one would, under the
matching principle, require finders of their losses to include such amounts in income. Because
finders, by definition, do not know the source of their recoveries, any rule for the taxation of
recoveries would violate the matching principle in some cases. A rule that errs on the side of
overinclusiveness is probably the least harmful of the two options. See infra text
accompanying notes 39-40.
[Vol. 79:813
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consistent with our general treatment of personal consumption
expenditures. The income that supports such expenditures is taxed
both in the hands of the original earner and in the hands of the trans-
feree.39 Although it is admittedly difficult to regard dropping money
on the street as a form of personal consumption, it may not be wholly
inappropriate to explain such losses as the implicit price of a life-
style-that is, absent-mindedness.
Fortunately, the inability to discern whether a violation of the
matching principle exists is less important in this context than in the
business gifts context. This is because the consequences of a mis-
match in the tax treatment of Jane and Mary are somewhere between
inconsequential and desirable. To the extent a mismatch exists, it
benefits the government, not the taxpayers. That is, the government
collects more tax than seems appropriate under the circumstances,
whereas Jane and Mary, taken together, pay too much tax. Theoreti-
cally, this gives the government an incentive to encourage individuals
to drop money on the street, but it strains credulity to believe that any
government would or could provide such encouragement. Thus, the
long-term result of this mismatch-if it is that-is to discourage tax-
payers from dropping money on the street-a result that one would
have a hard time faulting.
In contrast, mismatches and inconsistencies that operate to the det-
riment of the government and to the benefit of taxpayers tend to cre-
ate more serious distortions. For example, some mismatches allow
income to drop out of the tax base altogether, as did the original treat-
ment of business gifts, or to be taxed once, as in the case of consump-
tion items. Over time, taxpayers learn to utilize the mismatches to
reduce their tax liabilities. Because this reduction does not directly
increase any other taxpayer's tax liability, no taxpayer has any incen-
tive to interfere with such schemes. Indeed, those with the best
opportunity to interfere, other participants in the income-generating
transaction, are far more likely to try to obtain some of the benefits of
the tax reduction for themselves through bargaining than to prevent
the tax reduction from taking place. Not only does the tax base erode
as more taxpayers take advantage of the "loophole," but also the
39 Taxpayers may not deduct expenditures for "personal, living, or family expenses."
I.R.C. § 262(a) (1988). No provision in the Code allows the recipients of such expenditures to
exclude such amounts from their income.
1993]
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transactions that give rise to mismatches occur more frequently than
they would in a no-tax world.4° The increase in such transactions
may be undesirable even if there is no erosion of the tax base.4
It is a mismatch of this type that arguably underlies the much
maligned phenomenon of the "leveraged takeover," 42 or more gener-
ally, the substitution of corporate debt for equity.43 The way in which
40 The growth of the fringe benefit portion of overall compensation packages provides a
perfect example of this iterative process. These benefits, the cost of which are generally
deductible by the employer and excludable from the income of employees, grew from an
average of about 3.5% of the compensation package in 1960 to 4.9% in 1970 and 9% in 1981.
James E. Long & Frank A. Scott, Jr., The Impact of the 1981 Tax Act on Fringe Benefits and
Federal Tax Revenues, 37 Nat'l Tax J. 185, 185 (1984).
41 Although any tax-induced behavioral change theoretically represents a departure from
preexisting equilibrium, some of these departures may be justified on normative grounds.
Indeed, the favorable treatment of fringe benefits has traditionally been justified as a
mechanism for inducing employers to provide, and employees to accept, socially valuable and
individually undervalued forms of compensation. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 46 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673, 1718 (stating that purpose of life
insurance exemption is to encourage employers to provide life insurance); S. Rep. No. 938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 38-39 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3474-75
(ascribing same general purpose to exclusion of prepaid legal services). Other tax-induced
behaviors, however, may not serve or may even contravene the public interest. For example,
excluding the value of employer-provided parking from employees' income, an administrative
practice now enacted into law, Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911(b),
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3012-14 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(C)), has long been
thought to add to air pollution and highway overcrowding by discouraging carpooling and the
use of mass transit. See Donald C. Shoup, Cashing Out Free Parking, 36 Transp. Q. 351, 364
(1982); GAO Reports, Tax Laws Encourage Driving Over Use of Mass Transit, 57 Tax Notes
320 (1992). Congress may be coming around to this view as well. As of January 1, 1993,
taxpayers may exclude no more than $155 of such benefits per month. Energy Policy Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911(b), 1992 U.S.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3012-14 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 132(f)(2)(B)). Some have argued that the allowance of a deduction for personal casualty
losses-a deviation from the pattern of taxing all consumption expenditures twice, see supra
text accompanying notes 11-15--discourages the private purchase of insurance. Instead,
taxpayers rely on "free" government insurance, where the premiums in reality are paid by
other taxpayers, and in the process incur more risk than they actually desire. See Louis
Kaplow, The Income Tax As Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions
and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1485 (1991).
42 In a leveraged takeover, an investor or group of investors uses borrowed funds to
purchase a controlling interest in the outstanding shares of a target corporation. Though such
transactions take many forms, typically the investors establish a corporation that borrows the
funds necessary to purchase the desired shares of the target. This acquiring corporation then
purchases the target company's shares, after which the two corporations merge. The surviving
corporation thus assumes responsibility for repaying the acquisition debt.
43 Though leveraged buyouts are the most familiar method of adding debt to corporate
structures, similar results can be achieved through corporate restructurings (recapitalizations),
debt-financed business expansions, internal share repurchases, and extraordinary dividends.
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this mismatch materializes, however, is somewhat more complicated
than is generally recognized and, like the finder-loser example, raises
the question of whether a mismatch exists at all. This phenomenon,
along with the various congressional measures taken to remedy the
apparent mismatch, is the subject of Part II.
II. LEVERAGE, CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION, AND THE
MATCHING PROBLEM OF TAX-EXEMPT INVESTORS
It is generally agreed that corporations have increasingly turned to
banks and the bond market, rather than to the stock market, to raise
capital.' This increased reliance on debt is not limited to the financ-
ing of expansions of corporate activities-there has been a wave of
refinancing of existing operations with increased debt, including "junk
bonds," and less equity. These corporate acquisitions and recapitali-
zations have been condemned for leaving businesses and those who
rely upon them susceptible to disaster even in mild recessions.4- They
have also sparked fears that the changes in capital structure will lead
to "corporate cannibalism," with parts of ongoing entities sold or liq-
uidated in order to service or buy down heavy debt loads. Such own-
ership changes threaten employee security, to say nothing of the
stability of the community in which the business entities are located.
Much of the blame for this phenomenon has been laid at the door
of the tax system, which allegedly favors the use of debt rather than
equity in corporate structures. 6 Or, to put the problem in the terms
used in this Article, overleveraging is the result of failing to match
interest deductions with interest income inclusions. If the value of
See Willard B. Taylor & M. Bernard Aidinoff, Approaches to Debt: Is Integration the
Answer?, 67 Taxes 931, 931 (1989).
4 See, e.g., Paul J. Robertson, Zoel Daughtrey & Daryl V. Burckel, Debt or Equity? An
Empirical Analysis of Tax Court Classification During the Period 1955-1987, 47 Tax Notes
707, 707 (1990) ("Since 1983, over $300 billion of corporate equities have been retired by
nonfinancial corporations, while borrowing has increased by over $600 billion."); Peter C.
Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition, 39 Tax Law. 91, 91 (1985) ("There has been a
pronounced shift from equity to debt financing in virtually all lines of business, in public as
well as private companies."). This trend may be reversing, however. See Lee A. Sheppard,
The Obstacles to Corporate Tax Integration, 47 Tax Notes 1168, 1168 (1990) ("To the extent
that overleveraging was a problem, the financial markets have corrected it.").
45 See Canellos, supra note 44, at 92 n.5 (listing sources of criticism).
46 See, e.g., id. at 91; John D. Young, Jr., Comment, Federal Income Tax Law: Who Really
Bought RJR Nabisco?, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 141, 141-42 (1990).
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interest deductions were always offset by the tax liability incurred by
interest recipients, it is argued, no incentive to leverage would exist.
The next sections point out, however, that interest deductions gen-
erated by corporate leveraging are matched by interest income inclu-
sions; the problem lies in the fact that these interest inclusions often
have little or no tax consequences for the recipients. Part II.A.1
explains how matching occurs and tax liability remains the same if
corporate debt is held by tax-paying corporations. Part II.A.2 shows
how the purchase of corporate debt by noncorporate investors, in con-
trast, reduces overall tax liability. Part II.B. 1 shows how even greater
reductions occur when tax-exempt entities purchase corporate debt.
Because the apparent mismatch is thus a function of the tax charac-
teristics of one of the parties to the transaction rather than of leverag-
ing transactions in general, the focus of the dispute ought to be not on
the presence or absence of an interest deduction, but on the justifica-
tion for granting favored tax status to certain entities. The remainder
of Part II explores those justifications and congressional moves to
limit such entities' favorable tax treatment. In short, Part II demon-
strates that situations that appear problematic because they violate
the matching principle are in fact cause for concern-not for the fact
of the matching principle's violation but for reasons best understood
after its application.
A. Leveraged Takeovers
This Section applies the matching principle to leveraged takeovers.
These transactions do not present matching problems in neutral cir-
cumstances-that is, when creditors are ordinary, tax-paying corpora-
tions. What at first appears to be a matching problem arises when
creditors are noncorporate entities such as partnerships or proprietor-
ships. Rather than a matching problem, however, the "problem" is
better described as one of policing boundaries in an unintegrated tax
system. Thus, the matching principle focuses the analysis on the
proper policy question: whether corporations should be able to use
leveraged takeovers to receive the favorable "one-tier" tax treatment
that partnerships receive.
826 [Vol. 79:813
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L Neutral Circumstances
When a corporation finances its operations with debt rather than
equity, it can distribute its "profits" 47 in the form of tax-deductible
interest48 rather than nontax-deductible dividends and avoid the cor-
porate level income tax. No tax advantage results, however, if its
creditors are ordinary, tax-paying corporations. The tax liability
avoided by the debtor (First Corporation) is merely shifted to the
creditor (Second Corporation), which has to pay tax on its interest
income on a current basis.49 The tax payable on Second's interest
income should be approximately the same as the corporate income tax
avoided by First's interest deductions.50
In contrast, if Second held shares of stock in First instead of First's
debt, Second's dividend income would be largely excludable from its
taxable income because of the substantial intercorporate dividend
exclusion. 1 Moreover, what little tax Second would have to pay
could be deferred, without an interest charge, by having First retain
earnings rather than distribute its after-tax income each year. 2 In
47 For purposes of this Article, unless otherwise stated, the terms "profits" and "operating
profits" are used to denote gross revenues less all costs other than interest expenses.
48 Interest expenses incurred by a trade or business may be deducted from that business'
gross income. See I.RC. § 163(a) (1988).
49 See id. § 61(a)(4) (including interest in the definition of gross income). Some tax savings
are achieved if Second owns less than 80% of First. In such cases, a portion of the dividend
distributions received by Second would be subject to tax in Second's hands, see id. § 243(a)(1)
(allowing a 70% dividends-received deduction for dividends other than those received from
electing, affiliated corporations), resulting in a limited amount of double taxation of that
income. By receiving the dividends in the form of interest, the combination would eliminate
that degree of double taxation. Thus, for example, assuming a 34% marginal tax rate, if First
earned $200 and distributed it in its entirety to Second as interest, Second would have to pay
$68 in income tax. If First were capitalized solely with equity, it would pay a tax of $68 on
that income, leaving $132 to be distributed to shareholders. If all $132 were distributed to
nonaffiliated corporate shareholders, those shareholders would be liable for an additional
$13.46 of tax (.34 x (.30 x 132)).
50 This statement assumes that First and Second have similar tax characteristics, an
assumption that is not always borne out by the facts of a given situation. For a discussion of
the problems that result when First and Second are in markedly different tax circumstances,
see infra text accompanying notes 55-69, 80-84.
51 See I.R.C. § 243 (1988) (allowing corporations to deduct 70% or 100% of dividend
income, depending on extent of ownership interest in dividend payor).
52 Except in the case of a few foreign corporations, see id. § 951(a)(1) (regarding controlled
foreign corporations); id. § 1296 (regarding passive foreign investment companies), the Code
does not require shareholders to recognize their share of a corporation's income until the
corporation distributes the earnings to them outside of the corporate solution. See Eisner v.
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short, the aggregate, after-tax income and income tax liability of the
two corporations remains largely the same whether First is financed
primarily by debt or by equity. 3 What changes is the identity of the
corporation paying the tax. Hence, the decision whether to finance
First with debt or equity should not be affected by tax considerations.
In corporate finance terms, Modigliani and Miller's famous thesis
regarding the irrelevance of a firm's debt-equity ratio54 applies even in
a world complicated by taxes.
2. Nonneutrality: Mini-Matches and Integration
The neutrality of the tax system collapses, however, when Second is
taxed at less than the full corporate tax rate. In such cases, First and
Second can generate tax savings through the transfer of income and
the corresponding income tax obligation to Second by capitalizing
First with debt rather than equity." Such rate disparities may exist
for a number of reasons. Second may be an individual or other
noncorporate entity. The tax rates applicable to noncorporate tax-
payers are lower than corporate tax rates in two respects. The maxi-
mum individual tax rate is lower (31%)56 than the maximum
corporate tax rate (34%).57 Further, only corporate income is taxed
twice-once in the hands of the corporation and again in the hands of
its individual shareholders.5 8 The judicious use of debt allows taxpay-
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (rejecting argument that shareholders are taxable upon
receipt of stock dividends).
53 But see Lee A. Sheppard, Should the Dividends Received Deduction for Portfolio Stock
Be Increased?, 47 Tax Notes 390 (1990) (discussing recent study alleging that recent decreases
in the dividends received deduction were responsible for increasing the use of corporate debt).
54 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958).
55 The phenomenon is at one level just an assignment problem-which entity, First or
Second, truly "earned" the income? That is, does First earn the income on its own equity, or is
it attributable to Second's equity, which has in turn been lent to First for use in First's
operations? The question has an air of unreality to it in light of the fact that First's "own"
equity in fact also belongs to Second, inasmuch as Second is First's sole shareholder. Another
way of looking at the difficulties of solving the problem is to realize that nothing prevents
Second from carrying on First's activities itself. Moreover, it would be possible for neither
entity to exist but instead to have the individual shareholders of Second directly carry on both
corporations' activities.
56 See I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. 11 1990).
57 See I.R.C. § 11 (1988).
58 Dividend income is included in the Code's definition of gross income. See id. § 61(a)(7).
Corporate shareholders may deduct most or all of any dividend income received, depending on
the extent of their ownership interest in the dividend payor. See id. § 243 (allowing
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ers to avoid the double taxation scheme for corporate income, which
is similar to the tax treatment of consumption expenditures, in favor
of the friendlier one-tier, individual tax. It allows, in the words of one
commentator, the "unrestricted ad hoc integration of corporate and
shareholder taxation. '59
The integration just described may not seem like much of a match-
ing problem. After all, the interest deduction taken by First is
"matched" by an offsetting income inclusion by Second. The interest
payments, however, arguably are distributions of corporate profits
that ought to be taxed twice. The taxpayers violate the matching
principle by eliminating the inclusion at the corporate level through
the use of the interest deduction. Of course, one could make exactly
the same argument with respect to any expense deduction allowed
First. Any time payments are made to noncorporate recipients, the
effect is to reduce the amount of double-taxed corporate income. 60
Why should interest payments be singled out for special, disfavored
treatment or be of special concern?
One might respond that interest, like dividends, constitutes pay-
ment for the corporation's use of another's capital. As functional
equivalents, their tax treatment ought to be similarly equivalent. That
argument proves too much, however, both because of the long history
of different treatment of interest and dividends and because many
other types of payments can be recharacterized as payments for one
corporation's use of another's capital. Royalties, for example, may be
characterized as payments for the use of another's valuable asset-a
patent or other form of protected information-and this value can be
quantified in monetary terms. Royalties thus represent a return, be it
called interest or dividends, on the monetized value of that asset. The
fact that the money happens to be embodied in the form of a design or
technical information rather than dollar bills prior to its transfer to
the corporation does not change the fact that the corporation is essen-
tially paying a return on the capitalized value of the transferred asset.
corporations to deduct 100% of dividends paid by a member of the same affiliated group of
corporations and 70% otherwise). Individual shareholders have no comparable provision.
59 Canellos, supra note 44, at 91.
60 In fact, other countries have restricted the availability of non-interest deductions when
attempting to protect their corporate income tax bases from erosion. See, e.g., Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 1255, 1256-57 (6th Cir. 1992) (describing Spanish
restrictions on payment and deductibility of royalty expenses by Spanish corporation to United
States parent corporation).
1993]
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Put differently, instead of obtaining a license for the transferred infor-
mation and paying royalties on an ongoing basis, First Corporation
could have borrowed money at interest from the licensor, used the
loan proceeds to buy the information outright, and made interest
rather than royalty payments. The royalty payments are economi-
cally equivalent to the interest payments that would have been made
with respect to a loan equal to the value of the transferred informa-
tion. Other types of corporate expenditures could be similarly
recharacterized.
Indeed, it becomes clear that the real problem is defining the corpo-
rate tax base by differentiating the corporation's income from the
income of other participants in the corporation's income-producing
activities. In one sense, it is easier to perform that task for interest
expenses than for many others. The fungibility of money makes the
market value of money much easier to determine than the value of a
patent or copyright. Overpayments of interest, unlike overpayments
of royalties, are thus easy to identify. On the other hand, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine how much of a
firm's capital, absent the income tax, should or would have been pro-
vided in the form of once-taxed debt rather than in the form of
double-taxed equity.6 ' This problem is complicated by the fact that in
many cases one can imagine the business as a whole being structured
in noncorporate form, so that the debt-equity issue would never
become relevant; one-tax treatment would be automatic.
Rather than a matching problem, then, the overleveraging "prob-
lem" is one of policing boundaries in an unintegrated tax system and,
perhaps, of deciding whether such boundaries need to be policed at
all. Not surprisingly, some commentators do not regard the creation
of integration through leverage as a troubling phenomenon. Many
believe that an integrated tax system is preferable to one that imposes
two levels of tax on corporate income.62 These commentators can
claim impressive allies; most of our major trading partners allow some
61 Though Congress authorized the Treasury Department to develop regulations
differentiating between corporate debt and equity when it added § 365 to the Code in 1969, see
I.R.C. § 385(a) (Supp. II 1990), Treasury has yet to issue such regulations. Indeed, after a
drafting effort ended in failure in 1983, see Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Recent Corporate
Restructuring and the Corporate Tax System, 42 Tax Notes 715, 718 n.18 (1989), Treasury
abandoned the project entirely.
62 See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Brookings Institution, Must Corporate Income Be
Taxed Twice? (1979); John K. McNulty, Reform of the Individual Income Tax by Integration
830 [Vol. 79:813
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amelioration of the two-tax burden on corporate income, and some
provide complete integration.6 3
Even in the United States, Congress is best described as a partial
supporter of tax integration, for it allows "unrestricted, ad hoe inte-
gration" 4 for certain types of joint business endeavors. For example,
entities set up as partnerships are not subjected to income tax.65 Their
tax attributes flow through to their owners on a current basis.6 6 Thus,
to a very real extent, the worst that leveraged buyouts do is provide an
alternate mechanism for achieving a tax status that Congress often
considers a legitimate and acceptable alternative to the two-tax model
for business income.
The fact that taxpayers are increasingly inclined to choose the one-
tax over the two-tax model is not, in and of itself, necessarily a sign of
a serious flaw in the tax system.67 Nor is it evidence of nefarious
behavior by the taxpayers involved.68 What may be problematic,
of the Corporate Income Tax, 46 Tax Notes 1445, 1445 (1990); Alvin Warren, The Relation
and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 717 (1981).
63 See Statement of Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary (Tax Policy) John Wilkins at
Hearing on Leveraged Buyouts before House Ways and Means Committee, May 16, 1989,
reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), May 17, 1989, at L-17, L-19:
Eight of the 12 European Community member countries use such an approach, as do
Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Finland. In Germany, Italy, Australia,
and New Zealand, double taxation is completely eliminated by allowing the shareholder
to receive credit for the full tax paid by the corporation. Several other countries
substantially reduce double taxation; for example, in Belgium, France, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom, the shareholder credit amounts to at least half the corporate tax. In
Japan and Spain, the credit amounts to 10 percent of the dividends received.
64 Carnellos, supra note 44, at 91.
65 Partnerships are treated for tax purposes as conduits whose income passes through to the
partners, who in turn report their respective shares of the firm's income or loss on their
individual tax returns. 3 Bittker, supra note 4, 85.1.1, at 85-2; see I.R.C. §§ 701, 702 (1988).
66 I.R.C. § 702 (1988).
67 That is, unless one considers the maintenance of two, dissimilar taxing regimes for two
quite similar sets of circumstances a serious flaw. One can just as easily, however, describe the
situation as providing taxpayers with a choice of tax treatments, which they are free to choose
between on whatever basis they desire.
68 A recent article suggests that the imposition of a uniform, corporate level tax may solve
an agency problem that arises whenever multiowner entities are treated as mere conduits for
tax purposes. As different owners tend to have different tax characteristics, it is almost
inevitable that at times their desires for the most tax-efficient operation of the entity will
conflict-that is, one owner will desire a maximization of current income in a year in which
another owner desires maximum deferral. Entity managers are then placed in the
uncomfortable, but potentially profitable, position of determining which owner's tax agenda
will be furthered. The separation of the entity's and owner's tax burden through the
imposition of an independent corporate level tax obviates that conflict. Thus, both public and
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  831 1993
832 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 79:813
however, is that taxpayers have selected a method of arriving at the
one-level tax that is different from that intended and explicitly
allowed by Congress.6 9 This raises the possibility that the nontradi-
tional method of achieving one-level taxation confers some advan-
tages on the affected taxpayers that traditional, partnership treatment
does not, and that Congress's intention is to offer these advantages at
a price. It is important, therefore, to be clear as to the advantages of
the corporate form.
3. Advantages of the Corporate Form
One traditional business advantage associated with the use of the
corporate form is limited liability. But limited liability has for many
years also been available for partnership investments. Limited part-
nerships must have at least one general partner, but nothing in the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act or in the tax law prevents the gen-
eral partner from being a corporate shell, with only a small invest-
ment in the partnership and with limited resources.70 Thus, it is hard
to argue convincingly that the extra layer of tax imposed on corporate
income recompenses the government for the social costs of limited
liability-namely, that some unpaid creditors may become entitled to
government benefits or relief on account of a corporate default occur-
private purposes may be served by the establishment of a double tax system for corporate
income. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of
Incorporation, 77 Va. L. Rev. 211 (1991). Nonetheless, nothing in this rationale for the
maintenance of a two-tier tax system requires that adherence to it be mandatory. Avoiding
managerial conflicts of interest is a worthy goal, but it hardly constitutes an inalienable one.
Surely investors can intelligently decide for themselves whether the pursuit of such a goal is
worth its price.
69 This assumes that one regards the use of the interest deduction as somehow illicit, despite
the inclusion of § 163 in the Code. See I.R.C. § 163 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Many would
doubtless argue that the continued existence of unlimited interest deductions under § 163 in
most circumstances constitutes as explicit an authorization of the one-tier tax option as the
relevant partnership provisions.
70 Though the IRS and Treasury have attempted at various times to characterize such
partnerships as taxable associations, they have lost each of the test cases brought on the issue.
See 3 Bittker, supra note 4, % 85.1.6, at 85-12 to 85-13. The Service recently provided a safe
harbor for establishing that a limited partnership with one or more corporate general partners
lacks limited liability. Revenue Procedure 89-12 states that a partnership lacks limited liability
if the net worth of the corporate general partners equals at least ten percent of the total
contributions to the partnership, has substantial assets, or will act independently of the limited
partners. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798. For a fuller explication of this revenue ruling
and related materials, see Susan P. Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice
for Doing Business?, 41 U. Fla. L. Rev. 721, 734-37 (1989).
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ring in circumstances where noncorporate debtors could not so easily
default. The limited partnership vehicle also offers a measure of two
of the attributes traditionally associated with the corporate form-
continuity of life71 and free transferability of interests.72
Indeed, it seems that far from being advantaged compared to a
traditional partnership, the highly leveraged corporate combination,
in which Second is an individual, can be at a significant disadvantage.
The primary business disadvantage is that interest payments, unlike
either dividend or partnership distributions, must be made on a prede-
termined schedule regardless of business conditions.73 This rigidity
increases business risk and reduces managers' ability to respond
quickly to changing business conditions. Nor is it clear that such
combinations fare better than traditional partnerships from a tax
perspective.
In fact, they may fare somewhat worse. For example, partnerships
"pass through" all their income to their partners, who report and pay
tax on those profits at their marginal rates. In a leveraged corporate
structure, the interest payments distributed or deemed distributed are
taxed currently to the creditors at their marginal rates. Any income
that is not distributed, however, is taxed currently to the corporation
at a rate higher than the highest individual marginal tax rate and sub-
jected to tax once again in the year that it is distributed to individual
shareholders. 74 In this way, some of the income earned by a leveraged
corporation may be taxed at rates higher than those applicable to
partnership income. Certainly any income retained for corporate
expansion is so penalized. It must also be the case that corporate
managers avoid interest obligations to the extent that defaults by the
corporation threaten their own career stability.
On the other hand, a leveraged combination may also enjoy more
favorable tax treatment than a partnership. Advantageous treatment
occurs when the leveraged corporation uses corporate tax prefer-
71 See Hamill, supra note 70, at 727-28 n.34.
72 See id. at 738-39 nn.110-11.
73 At least this is true whenever the debt instrument requires such payments, and the failure
of a debt instrument to so provide may lead to its reclassification as equity.
74 Any intervening corporate shareholder may deduct all or most of the dividend income
pursuant to § 243 of the Code. See I.R.C. § 243 (1988); see also supra note 49 for an
explanation of that provision's workings.
1993]
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ences 75 in addition to the interest deduction to reduce its income, so
that only a portion of its income is currently taxed. Although the
untaxed income will eventually be taxed twice, the gains from post-
poning the imposition of any tax may outweigh the economic disad-
vantage of the eventual double tax burden. It is an empirical
question, with no ready evidence, whether the amount of such disad-
vantaged corporate income exceeds or falls short of the income that is
treated more favorably than partnership income. If such corporate
tax advantages are substantial, however, the solution to the mismatch
may be to cut back on those preferences rather than to restrict the
interest deduction. One reason for the existence of those advantages,
after all, is to mitigate the deleterious effects of the two-tier tax on
corporate income. If the second tier is easy to avoid through the use
of leverage, why should taxpayers be provided with yet another
method of escape? Conversely, if the alternate escape method serves
an independent purpose, why is it cause for concern if a taxpayer
utilizes both leverage and corporate preferences?
One indication that limited partnership status is generally prefera-
ble to that of a leveraged corporate combination is that entities have
migrated from the latter to the former. Indeed, Congress recognized
and feared the effect of this migration on the corporate tax base.76
Despite the fact that such transformations from the leveraged corpo-
rate form to an unleveraged partnership form would reduce, if not
eliminate, the susceptibility of leveraged combinations to economic
disaster-a susceptibility that is the foundation for most critics' con-
75 It is not so much that corporations have preferences that individuals and partnerships do
not, but rather that they are exempt from certain limitations on using those preferences that
apply to individuals and partnerships. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) (1988) (limiting deduction
for investment interest "[i]n the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation"); id. § 469(a)(2)
(applying disallowance to individuals, estates, trusts, closely held C corporations, and personal
service corporations). Thus, corporations may reduce their taxable income below their
economic income to an extent that other taxpayers may not, resulting in additional deferral of
their income tax obligations.
76 In a recent study, the Treasury Department noted a "significant[ ] increase[ ]" in the
number of widely held partnerships, a phenomenon that it found "not surprising" and one that
"will continue to grow." See Treasury Department Study, Widely Held Partnerships:
Compliance and Administration Issues, Submitted to Congress March 30, 1990, reprinted in
64 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 3, 1990, at L-l, L-3.
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demnation of such deals 77 -Congress recently made such transforma-
tions all but impossible by mandating the imposition of two-tier tax
treatment on "publicly-traded partnerships. ' 7  Inasmuch as it is
unclear why public trading of ownership interests should lead to an
increase in tax liability, it must be the case that Congress was primar-
ily interested in stemming anticipated revenue losses. 79 The problem,
however, is that the adoption of the constraint on partnerships may
simply lead to the continuation of the leveraging trend-resulting in
little revenue savings and generating serious bankruptcy costs.
B. Beyond Integration: Tax-Exempt Lenders
Although the use of debt to achieve integration, or one-tier taxa-
tion, may not violate any of the fundamental tenets of a sensible (even
unintegrated) tax system, the use of debt to eliminate completely the
tax on business profits seems to present a strong case for concern.
This result would occur if all taxpayers leveraged to the limit and all
debt were held by tax-exempt entities.80 The matching principle sug-
77 See Patricia L. Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 1039, 1041
(1987); Canellos, supra note 44, at 92 n.5 (listing articles describing concerns about business
risks).
78 See Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(a), 101 Stat. 1330 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 7704 (1988)).
79 Although one can plausibly argue that the existence of a two-tiered tax structure as an
alternative in such cases makes sense, given the agency problem, see supra note 68, again the
case for making such a structure mandatory seems less than overwhelming, particularly as
applied to new accumulations of capital. Given the present rate structure with its much
heavier taxation of corporate income, the identity of the alternative constituting the "lesser of
two evils" is not obvious. Why should investors be deprived of the opportunity to make their
own judgments on this matter?
80 A corporation in the position of Second may not pay tax for a number of reasons. This
Article discusses only one of these at length: where Second is a tax-exempt organization. For
discussion of another variation, where Second is a foreign corporation, see Julie A. Roin,
Section 163(j): An International Tax Benefit Rule (April 21, 1993) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Other possibilities that are mentioned in
the literature are that Second may be a loss corporation, a bank, or an insurance company.
The arguments for and against generous treatment of losses hve been thoroughly discussed
elsewhere. See, e.g., Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for
Full Loss Offsets, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 709 (1981); Richard L. Bacon & Nicholas A. Tomasuo,
Net Operating Loss and Credit Carryovers: The Search for Corporate Identity, 20 Tax Notes
835 (1983); Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, On the Benefits of Loss Recoupment: A
Response, 21 Tax Notes 209 (1983); American Law Inst., Federal Income Tax Project
Subchapter C: Proposals on Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions 198-301 (1982). The
"tax-free" status of banks is due to their heavy capitalization with debt-that is, they earn
money through use of depositors' funds. In a sense, banks are the original leveraged
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gests that the existence of such a mismatch requires close investiga-
tion. However, such investigation reveals that here too the problem is
not the lack of an offsetting income inclusion but rather the effect (or
rather noneffect) of such an inclusion due to the nature of the recipi-
ent taxpayer. As the tax-exempt nature of such taxpayers results
from deliberate congressional policy, the mismatch can be corrected
only at the expense of that policy. As explained below, Congress has
in the past appeared willing to compromise its policy of favoring tax-
exempt entities in order to preserve tax revenues; a recently enacted
piece of legislation appears to compromise it still further."1 Closer
examination reveals that despite these appearances, little has been
done to correct the "problem." Perhaps for good reason, Congress
has decided to preserve the favorable treatment of tax-exempts despite
its revenue implications.
L Aggregate Matching
Congress has long exempted a variety of not-for-profit entities from
the income tax. 2 This exemption appears to violate the matching
principle because payments that would be treated as income in the
hands of ordinary recipients are "nonincome" in the hands of tax-
exempt entities. Amounts deducted by payors as charitable contribu-
tions generate no corresponding, or matching, inclusions. To the
extent that these transfers could be characterized as "consumption
expenditures"-as they might in the case of dues paid to maintain
one's place of worship-both the payor 3 and the recipient avoid
being taxed. However, the deviations from established patterns may
not be quite as complete as first appears.
combination. As long as the depositors' pay tax on their interest income, for the reasons stated
in the text, it is folly to regard such arrangements as "tax-advantaged" or to consider banks to
be tax exempt. Insurance companies pay little tax because of the generous rules for calculating
reserves. To the extent that insurance company payouts are excluded from policyholders'
income, interest payments do escape from tax. The implications of that escape are analogues
to the implications for any tax exempt organization discussed in the next section.
81 See I.R.C. § 163(j) (Supp. 11 1990); infra text accompanying notes 104-15 (describing
that provision).
82 See I.R.C. § 501(c) (1988) (listing types of organizations qualifying for exemption from
income tax). Probably the two most financially significant of these activities are public
charities and pension funds.
83 This assumes that the payor/transferor is entitled to a deduction under § 170, or § 404 in
the case of contributions to an employee pension fund, for the amount transferred to the tax-
exempt entity.
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A match, albeit a remote one, occurs whenever the tax-exempt
entity makes what would for taxable entities be considered "deducti-
ble" expenditures because the expenses of tax-exempt entities are not
recognized as deductions any more than their revenues are taxed as
income. The nondeductibility of expenditures by tax-exempt entities
is often mismatched with the inclusion of these expenditures in the
income of taxpayers on the receiving end of these expenditures. The
overall treatment can therefore be described as one in which there are
as many inclusions as deductions even though one set of deductions
and income is skipped. In the aggregate the matching principle is
maintained, and the total picture converges on the familiar one-tax
business model.
Consider, for example, a college that raises funds to support stu-
dent scholarships. A donor to this cause receives a deduction for con-
tributions, and neither the first (the college), the second (the student),
nor the third (the college, which then "collects" the scholarship
money from the student) recipient includes the funds in its income.
However, the employees of the college who are paid out of the tuition
money generated by the scholarship pay taxes on their wages. There
is, therefore, an initial deduction and an eventual inclusion, and the
college and its scholarship students can be seen as harmless
intermediaries between donors and instructors.
This treatment might be regarded as perfectly routine if all the
transfers were labeled as "business expenditures." But the treatments
seem preferential because many of the intermediate transfers more
closely resemble consumption expenditures than they do business
expenses. When students, or their parents, pay tuition out of earned
taxable income, they are not entitled to deductions for these payments
because education is generally treated as a consumption item.
Furthermore, rational, profit-maximizing businesses generally do
not price their products at less than average cost, as the college grant-
ing the scholarship has done, so that the revenue foregone by the col-
lege, or transferred in the form of a scholarship, looks not like a cost
of business but rather like some form of consumption. If the transac-
tions are more consumption than business-like, then the overall pic-
ture should contain at least one more inclusion than deduction. Yet
we have seen that the donor's deduction is ultimately offset only by
one level of inclusion. The tax exemption available to colleges and
other entities thus arguably affords consumption expenditures involv-
19931 837
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ing tax-exempts the more favorable tax treatment normally applied to
business transactions.
In addition, tax-exempt organizations have an advantage over busi-
nesses with regard to the treatment of savings. Unexpended funds of
tax-exempt entities can be accumulated and multiplied free of income
tax, unlike the internally-generated capital earned by businesses. In
both cases the savings are presumably intended for future expenses or
expansion, but only tax-exempts can earn tax-free income on these
savings without investing in tax-free municipal bonds. This advan-
tage undoubtedly makes it easier for tax-exempt organizations to
accumulate and retain capital.84
2. Congressional Limits on Tax-Exempt Income: The Unrelated
Business Income Tax
Congress has not, however, extended this preferential treatment to
all income of tax-exempt entities. Profits derived from activities not
directly related to the achievement of the entity's exempt function are
subject to the unrelated business income tax, or "UBIT."85 Under the
UBIT rules, exempt organizations pay tax calculated at normal cor-
porate income tax rates on all "unrelated business income."86 The
provision of funds for the support of an exempt function by a "feeder
organization" is considered an unrelated activity. Therefore, profits
from business activities otherwise unrelated to the entity's exempt
function are taxed even if all of those profits ultimately finance the
entity's exempt purposes.8 7
The initial rationale for imposing such a tax was to prevent busi-
nesses owned by tax-exempts from deriving an unfair competitive
84 Indeed, it was precisely the ease with which tax exempt entities could accumulate capital
that led Congress to impose restrictions on their ability to accumulate capital through debt-
financed investments. See S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950), reprinted in 1950
U.S. Code Cong. Serv., 3053, 3081; Committee on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Written Statements by Interested Individuals and Organizations on Treasury Department
Report on Private Foundations, 30, 45-52 (Comm. Print 1965). On the other hand, at least
one commentator has argued that tax-exempt organizations need the tax subsidy to overcome
the inherent disadvantages that they face when trying to raise capital for expansion of their
tax-exempt activities. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 Yale LJ. 54, 75 (1981).
85 See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (1988) (imposing tax at regular rates on "unrelated business
taxable income" of charitable organizations and trusts).
86 Id.
87 See id. § 502(a).
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advantage over similar taxable businesses. Congress feared that the
tax-exempt organizations would use their tax subsidies to aid their
businesses, expanding them to the detriment of their competitors who
are not tax-favored, rather than to finance their tax-exempt mis-
sions.88 A subsidiary justification for withdrawing the exemption in
certain cases was to protect the federal fisc from erosion through the
transfer of business ownership to tax-exempts.8 9
The UBIT does not, however, reach "passive" income, such as divi-
dends, interest, royalties, and most rents.90 Organizations can easily
avoid the tax by investing their accumulated capital in assets generat-
ing those types of income rather than active business assets, often with
no loss in economic return. The UBIT thus channels investments by
88 The UBIT provisions were first enacted in 1950 in reaction to complaints about the New
York University Law School's 1948 acquisition of the Mueller Macaroni Company. As
N.Y.U. pleaded in court for its right under existing law to operate the macaroni company free
of corporate income taxes, see C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951),
owners of other macaroni companies pleaded with Congress to change the law to preserve
their right to be free of "unfair competition" from businesses owned by tax-exempt entities.
They were afraid that N.Y.U. would use its tax subsidy to create a macaroni monopoly rather
than further its educational mission. Though the profits from the monopoly might eventually
be used to support N.Y.U.'s educational activities, macaroni producers were afraid that the
immediate consequence of Mueller's tax exemption would be the destruction of their own
businesses. See Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 579-80 (1950) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("[I]f something is not
done .... the macaroni monopoly will be in the hands of the universities .. "); H.R. Rep.
No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 84, at 28. Though
N.Y.U. prevailed in its court case, see C.F. Mueller Co., 190 F.2d at 123, its opponents
prevailed in their congressional effort. See Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, §§ 301,
331, 64 Stat. 906, 947-53, 957-59 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 502-514 (1988)). More
recently, economists and other commentators have tried to evaluate the seriousness of the
unfair competition claim. Most have concluded that it is overblown, if not totally inaccurate,
because it makes more financial sense for the tax-exempt to invest in other ventures rather than
to expand or to try to monopolize an existing business if the funds freed by the tax subsidy are
not immediately needed to defray expenses incurred in its charitable mission. See, e.g., Boris I.
Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 319-26 (1976); Henry B. Hansmanm, Unfair Competition
and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605, 609-12 (1989); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1017, 1036-
39 (1982); Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 581, 591-92 (1965). At least one commentator, however,
has come up with a convincing argument for the UBIT's retention on other grounds. See
Hansmann, supra, at 614-23 (asserting that retention of UBIT promotes economic efficiency
and preserves the corporate tax base).
89 See S. Rep. No. 2375, supra note 84, at 31; H.R. Rep. No. 2319, supra note 88, at 36-37;
Hansmann, supra note 88, at 622-23.
90 See I.R.C. § 512(b) (1988).
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tax-exempt entities into passive business interests more than it raises
tax revenues. One explanation for the active-passive distinction is
that passive investment creates less direct competition with for-profit
entrepreneurs than does participation in active business assets.
Another is that it works to dissuade tax-exempt organizations from
actively managing business enterprises, because they would often be
relatively inefficient and inexpert managers of unrelated businesses.91
The law as originally written, however, imperfectly achieved the
channelling function of the UBIT. For example, if the Second in a
leveraged combination were a tax-exempt entity, neither First nor
Second would pay any income tax on the earnings used to pay the
interest due on the debt held by Second. First would get a deduction
for interest paid, whereas Second would report no income on its
receipt of this interest. Such income would simply drop out of the tax
base altogether, 92 even where the "debt" was functionally equivalent
to "equity"93 or the organization owned all the equity as well as the
outstanding debt.
The best known example of a pre-UBIT "unrelated" investment is
provided by the facts of CF Mueller v. Commissioner.94 In that case,
New York University could have continued to receive the income
generated by the Mueller Macaroni Company, which the university
owned, free of tax simply by recapitalizing the corporation to include
substantial debt. If N.Y.U. held all of Mueller Macaroni's debt and
equity, N.Y.U. would have received interest payments on the debt tax
free, and Mueller Macaroni could have deducted the interest pay-
ments to N.Y.U.95 This leveraged combination plan allowed a tax-
exempt organization to reap the benefits of an unrelated business
91 See Hansmann, supra note 88, at 614-21 (outlining various efficiency objections to tax-
exempt ownership of unrelated businesses).
92 If, however, the income was subsequently spent by the charity in a form in which it
became taxable to the recipient, it will be retained in the tax base. See supra text
accompanying notes 83-84.
93 Exactly what the distinction between "debt" and "equity" means, as well as how to
enforce it, has long been a subject of dispute in the tax arena. See supra note 61.
94 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
95 The scheme worked equally well if N.Y.U. "rented" the business to a "management
group" for an amount equal to the group's total net profits from operation, taking into account
a reasonable charge for salaries for members of the management group. This variation was, in
fact, the one originally exploited by taxpayers. See H. Neil Belier, Exempt Organizations:
Taxation of Debt-Financed Income, 24 Tax Law. 489, 490-91 (1971) (describing "bootstrap
sales").
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enterprise virtually free of income tax. Congress enacted the UBIT to
eliminate this kind of arrangement.
Tax-exempt investors had other means of circumventing the origi-
nal UBIT "one-tier tax" rule. The one-level tax on income derived
from unrelated businesses could also be made to disappear when (1)
the business generated "rents" for a tax-exempt Second;96 (2) the busi-
ness profits could be attributed to intellectual property owned by a
tax-exempt Second and, hence, be distributed to it in the form of
96 See I.R.C. § 512(b)(3) (1988) (excluding rents from real property from the definition of
gross income derived by an organization from an unrelated trade or business). The
predecessor to leveraged combinations utilized this statutory exemption. In a transaction
called a Clay Brown or "bootstrap acquisition":
The exempt middleman purchases the selling corporation's stock, liquidates the
corporation, and pays a stipulated amount of the liquidated assets to the sellers as a
down payment. The exempt organization then forms a new "operating company"
(typically with nominal capitalization) that is put under the control of either the sellers
or trusted associates. The operating company leases the assets of the liquidated
corporation from the exempt middleman in exchange for a "rental" that is based upon
the net profits generated by the operating company (typically 80 percent). The exempt
middleman in turn pays a fixed percentage of such "rent" (typically 90 percent) to the
sellers in satisfaction of either a note bearing no interest or other similar obligation
securing the purchase price of the stock.
Beller, supra note 95, at 491. The term Clay Brown originates from Commissioner v. Brown,
380 U.S. 563 (1965). Like leveraged combination arrangements, these transactions allowed
most of the business's profits to be distributed to the tax-exempt party in a nontaxable form,
with the distribution taking the form of rent rather than interest. However, Clay Brown con-
ferred an additional advantage on the sellers-namely, that all the payments that the sellers
received on their note would be treated as capital gains, which were taxed at favorable rates in
that period. Id. at 491-92. Much of the advantage from capital gains treatment was elimi-
nated by the addition to the Code in the early 1960's of depreciation recapture and imputed
interest provisions. Id. at 496. Congress further cut back on the usefulness of the Clay Brown
technique with a series of statutory changes in which it narrowed the UBIT rental exception.
The rental exception now applies only if the amount of rent payable does not depend on the
income or profits derived by any party from the leased property, see I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(B)(ii)
(1988), and if an "incidental" amount of the rents are attributable to personal, rather than real
property. See id. § 512(b)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(c)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1981)
(defining incidental as no more than 10%); see generally 4 Bittker, supra note 4, 103.3-
103.4, at 103-14 to 103-21 (discussing limitations placed by Congress on rental exceptions, and
analyzing the inclusion of debt-financed income in the unrelated business income tax). The
final blow came with enactment of § 514 of the Code, which includes an exempt organization's
gross income from "debt-financed property" in its unrelated business income, whether the
receipt is characterized as rent, interest, capital gain, or otherwise. See I.R.C. § 514 (1988);
Beller, supra note 95, at 489. This provision reaches the elaborate variations on the Clay
Brown theme that might otherwise escape the statutory net. See 4 Bittker, supra note 4,
103.3-103.4, at 103-21.
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"royalties"; 97 or (3) the business profits could be donated to a tax-
exempt Second after being earned by a taxable entity or individual,
which then took a deduction for the value of the donation.98 The
leveraged combination technique was, however, by far the most pow-
erful technique for avoiding tax. The other mechanisms succeeded
only in limited factual situations or, in the case of mechanism (3),
were constrained by limitations on the deductibility of charitable
contributions.99
In any event, Congress could not and did not allow such easy
escapes from the UBIT. In 19 6 9 ,1co Congress amended the Code to
provide that the passive income exception to the UBIT would not
operate in the case of "interest, annuities, royalties, and rents"
derived from any organization "controlled" by a tax-exempt entity. 101
97 Royalties, like rents, are excluded from the UBIT tax base. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(2) (1988)
(excluding "all royalties (including overriding royalties) whether measured by production or
by gross or taxable income from the property").
98 The Code limits charitable deductions to a set percentage of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income. The precise percentage allowed depends on the type of taxpayer, the type of property
donated, and certain characteristics of the charitable donee. See id. § 170(b) (detailing
percentage limitations). Amounts donated in excess of this deductible amount may be carried
forward and claimed as a charitable deduction in any of the five succeeding years, to the extent
allowable under the limitation rules in effect for those years. See id. § 170(d). Taxpayers may
not claim a deduction for any excess amounts that are not deducted within this five-year
period, and such a taxpayer is treated as if it had never made such donations.
99 Although individuals and corporations may donate as much of their income to charity as
they please, deductions for those donations are limited to specified percentages of their
adjusted gross income. See id. § 170(b) (establishing percentage limitations). Furthermore,
although taxpayers may avoid taxes on the entirety of their business income if they have
enough income from other sources, they may not use the charitable deduction to avoid the
entirety of their income tax obligation.
100 This is the same year in which Congress moved to shut down Clay Brown transactions.
See supra note 96. This is not to imply that Congress had never before imposed restrictions on
the tax-exempt privileges of tax exempt entities. An earlier, flawed version of the Clay Brown
legislation (affecting certain rental income) had been enacted in 1950. See 4 Bittker, supra note
4, 1 103.4, at 103-16 to 103-18 (describing legislation and avoidance opportunities). Moreover,
Congress had always included a limitation on the percentage of income a donor might deduct
on account of charitable deductions, thus potentially subjecting larger donations to tax in the
hands of the donor. See Don Fullerton, Tax Policy Toward Art Museums, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 3379, at 10-11 (1990) (recounting American history
of deductions for charitable contributions).
101 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(b), 83 Stat. 487, 537-40
(codified at I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (1988)). "Control" is defined by reference to the standards
found in I.R.C. § 368(c). See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (1988). Hence, the exception to the passive
income exception to the UBIT rules applies in the case of income paid by entities 80% or more
of whose stock is held by the tax exempt entity. See id. § 368(c).
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Specifically, the proportion of such income equal to the proportion of
the payor's (First's) income that is unrelated business income is
included in the payee's (Second's) "unrelated business gross income"
if Second controls First.1 02 A tax-exempt Second may take appropri-
ate deductions, but must then pay tax on the remaining income at
regular corporate rates.
In the N.Y.U. case, for example, the proportion of the interest pay-
ments received by N.Y.U. from Mueller equal to the proportion of
Mueller's income that constitutes "unrelated business income," pre-
sumably 100%, would be treated as unrelated business income in the
hands of N.Y.U. With all of the interest income being subject to the
unrelated business income tax in the hands of Second (N.Y.U.), there
is no gain to N.Y.U from holding any of Mueller's debt. Indeed, the
tax liability remains about the same whether N.Y.U. holds only stock
in Mueller 1 3 or simply owns and operates the assets of Mueller's
directly. Furthermore, in both cases the tax bite is greater than if
N.Y.U. passively invests the same sum in bonds issued by unrelated
companies.
3. Expanding Support for the UBIT: The Enactment of§ 1630)
Twenty years after the 1969 UBIT reforms, Congress enacted
another statute, codified as § 163(j), which seems to reinforce the
UBIT. Coming as it did in the middle of the controversy over lever-
aged takeovers, this statutory reform may also be viewed as an
attempt to curb tax-exempt entities' involvement in those transac-
tions."° But like the original UBIT provisions, this new statute is
102 See id. § 512(b)(13).
103 The exception to the UBIT passive income exception does not apply to dividend income,
presumably because such income has already been subjected to one full level of corporate tax.
Congress apparently determined that avoiding the second level of tax-that is, achieving
integration-was acceptable.
104 But cf. New York State Bar Association Tax Section Committee on U.S. Activities of
Foreign Taxpayers, Report on Section 163(j) of the Internal Revenue Code, 47 Tax Notes
1495, 1496 (1990) (suggesting that § 163(j)'s application to tax-exempts was a Congressional
attempt to avoid antidiscrimination provisions of international tax treaties yet target foreign
taxpayers-the real purpose of the provision). Including domestic tax-exempts within the
scope of the provision allowed Congress to argue that it was merely treating "similarly situated
persons similarly," Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Statement of the Managers, Standard
Fed. Tax Rep., Nov. 22, 1989, at 67, after determining "which persons are similarly situated
... by reference to the U.S. tax those persons do or do not bear on interest income from U.S.
corporations." Id. at 68. This comparison convinced Treasury, which withdrew it opposition
1993]
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unlikely to have much effect on tax revenues--or on the proclivity of
tax-exempts to participate in corporate leveraging transactions.
Under § 163(j), certain corporations are denied deductions for
"disqualified interest paid or accrued by such corporation during such
taxable year."105 Only corporations with a debt to equity ratio in
excess of 1.5 to 1106 and "excess interest expense" 107 --that is, a net
interest expense in excess of 50% of adjusted taxable income'°8--are
affected by the disallowance. Most importantly, the disallowance, in
turn, applies only to excess interest" 9 paid to an entity "related"
through a 50% or greater ownership stake' 10 and in whose hands the
interest is exempt from income tax.
In one respect § 163(j) is more limited in its reach than the 1969
reforms because it affects only payments of interest"' between related
entities. Unlike the original statute, payments of annuities, royalties,
to the bill-or, at least, supported the claim that the statute was nondiscriminatory after its
enactment. See Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), U.S.
Department of Treasury, to Keijiro Koyama, Managing Director, Keidanren (January 22,
1990) (on file with the Virgina Law Review Association). Others still have their doubts. 'See
Richard L. Doernberg & Kees van Raad, The Legality of the Earnings-Stripping Provision
Under U.S. Income Tax Treaties, 2 Tax Notes Int'l 199 (1990) (arguing that § 163(j) violates
nondiscrimination provisions in tax treaties).
105 I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
106 Id. § 163(j)(2)(A)(ii); see also id. § 163(j)(2)(C) (defining "ratio of debt to equity").
107 Id. § 163(j)(2)(A)(i).
101 Id. § 163(j)(2)(B). "Adjusted taxable income" means the taxable income of the
taxpayer computed without regard to any deduction for net interest expense; any net operating
loss deduction; or any depreciation, amortization or depletion expenses. Id. § 163(j)(6)(A).
"Excess interest expense" is decreased by any "excess limitation carryforward," id.
§ 163(j)(2)(B)(i)(I1), which is the amount by which the corporation's interest expense fell
short of the "excess interest expense" cut-off in the three preceding years. Id.
§ 163(j)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). For example, if Mueller Macaroni paid $25 in interest on pre-interest
earnings of $100 in 1989 and $75 in interest on pre-interest earnings of $100 in 1990, it would
have no "excess interest expense" in 1990 because its $75 expense does not exceed 50% of $100
plus the $25 of "excess limitation carryforward" it is allowed from 1989.
109 The disallowance applies to "'disqualified interest'" which, technically speaking,
consists of any interest paid "to a related person if no tax is imposed by this subtitle with
respect to such interest." Id. § 163(j)(3)(A). However, § 163(j)(1)(A) also provides that
"[tihe amount disallowed under the preceding sentence shall not exceed the corporation's
excess interest expense for the taxable year."
110 Id. § 163(j)(4)(A) (cross-referencing §§ 267(b) and 707(b)(1)).
III The new rule takes effect only when the interest payor's ratio of debt to equity
(calculated in accordance with enumerated statutory rules) exceeds 1.5 to 1, see id.
§ 163(j)(2)(A)(ii), and only to the extent that the interest itself exceeds 50% of the payor's
adjusted taxable income "plus any excess limitation carryforward." Id. § 163(j)(2)(B)(i)(II).
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and rents are not addressed by § 163(j).1 12 However, it is also more
expansive than earlier law because it affects transactions between less
closely related Firsts and Seconds. The pre-1989 restrictions applied
whenever one of the entities "controlled" or owned at least 80% of
the other entity. '1 3 The new legislation applies whenever the entities
are linked by a 50% or greater ownership interest. 1 4 Also, unlike the
1969 reforms, § 163(j) has the effect of levying additional taxes on the
interest payor (First) rather than the on the interest recipient
(Second).1 15
These differences could have undesirable effects if § 163(j) were
ever to apply to an actual tax-exempt entity. One side-effect of its
peculiar structure, unlike the 1969 reforms, is to deflect some of the
cost of the additional tax on to "innocent" co-investors in the enter-
prise.116 Because, by definition, § 163(j) comes into effect in the tax-
exempt entity context only when substantial outside ownership inter-
ests in First exist, this side-effect can be substantial. If 20% or less of
First is owned by shareholders who are unrelated to Second, pay-
ments of interest by First will be taxable in Second's hands under the
statutory rules enacted in 1969.117 The disallowance mandated by
§ 163(j) applies only to interest paid or accrued to a related person "if
no tax is imposed by this subtitle with respect to such interest."" 8
Thus, § 163(j) will never mandate a disallowance of an interest
112 Cf. I.R.C. § 512(b) (1988) (excluding annuities, royalties, and rents).
113 Id. § 512(b)(13) (referencing § 368(c)).
114 The legislation applies to certain payments of interest made to a "related person." See
I.R.C. § 163(j)(3)(A) (Supp. 11 1990). The term "related person" is defined by reference to
§§ 267(b) and 707(b)(1) of the Code, both of which use 50% ownership as the test of
relatedness between taxpayers. See id. § 163(j)(4)(A); I.R.C. §§ 267(b), 707(b)(1) (1988).
115 The operative provision prevents the interest payor from deducting any "disqualified
interest." See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A) (Supp. 111990). "Disqualified interest" is interest which:
(1) is paid or accrued by the taxpayer to a related tax-exempt person, see id. § 163(j)(3)(A); (2)
when added to the payor's other interest expenses for the year, exceeds 50% of the payor's
adjusted taxable income, which is calculated without reference to the interest deduction and
certain other allowable deductions, see id. § 163(j)(6)(A); and (3) is paid or accrued in a year
in which the payor's debt-equity ratio exceeds 1.5 to 1, see id. § 163(j)(2)(A). As a result, the
payor's taxable income becomes higher than it would be in the absence of the provision,
leading to a higher income tax obligation. For an example of this section in operation, see
infra text accompanying notes 119-34.
116 For a more complete discussion of this phenomenon, see Roin, supra note 80.
17 See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (1988).
11 I.R-C. § 163(j)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1990) (defining "'disqualified interest'"); id.
§ 163(j)(1)(A) (disallowing deduction of certain "disqualified interest").
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deduction unless more than 20% of First is held by unrelated share-
holders. In such a case, more than 20% of the costs of the disallow-
ance will be absorbed by innocent shareholders.
By way of illustration, suppose that N.Y.U. owned only 60% of
Mueller and that 40% was owned by unrelated, taxable entities. Sup-
pose also that two-thirds of Mueller's capital, say $20,000, was pro-
vided in the form of debt bearing interest at 10% and held by its
shareholders in proportion to their stockholdings. If Mueller's pre-
tax, pre-interest gross income was $3,000 in the year prior to enact-
ment of § 163(j), the tax consequences would be as follows: Mueller
would distribute $2,000 of its $3,000 earnings to its shareholders as
interest and retain the remainder. Of the distributed $2,000, N.Y.U.
would receive $1,200 net of tax, and the other creditors would receive
$528 after paying taxes of $272.119 Of the retained $1,000, $340
would go to the government in taxes and $660 would be left to be
distributed to the shareholders, either in the form of dividends or
additional proceeds on the sale of the underlying stock. Of this
amount, $396120 would go to N.Y.U. and $264121 would go to the
other shareholders, who would be left with about $237 after paying
$26.92 in additional taxes, assuming the distribution took the form of
a dividend. 122 Thus, N.Y.U. would enjoy $1,596,123 the other share-
holders $765,124 and the Treasury $639 of Mueller's earnings. 125
In contrast, after § 163(j)'s enactment, Mueller would be deemed
to have $500 of excess interest. 126 Thus, despite the fact that it will
retain only the same $1000 after paying its interest obligations, Muel-
119 .34 x $800 = $272. This assumes a 34% tax rate.
120 .60 x $660 = $396.
121 $660 - $396 = $264.
122 If the other shareholder were an unrelated corporation, it would be entitled to deduct
70% of the $264 dividend (.70 x $264 = $184.80) from its income. See I.R.C. § 243(a)(1).
Thus, only $79.30 would be included in the corporation's income from the dividend ($264 -
$184.80 = $79.20), generating a tax of $26.92 (.34 x $79.20 = $26.92).
123 $1200 (interest) + $396 (dividends) = $1596.
124 $528 + $237 = $765.
125 $272 (taxes levied on interest received by the taxable shareholders) + $340 (corporate
taxes levied on Mueller's taxable income) + $26.92 (taxes on levied the dividends received by
the taxable shareholders) = $639.
126 Five-hundred dollars is the amount by which Mueller's interest payments exceed one-
half of its "adjusted taxable income," within the meaning of § 163(j)(6)(A). Under the
assumed facts, Mueller also violates the 1.5 to I debt-equity safe harbor of § 163(j)(2)(A).
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ler's taxable income would be $1,500.127 This income would generate
a corporate tax liability of $510,128 leaving retained earnings of$490.129 Of this amount, $294130 would be attributable to N.Y.U.
shares and $196-about $176 after shareholder taxes are taken into
account-to the shares of other stockholders. N.Y.U.'s implicit tax
obligation on account of § 163(j) would be $102,131 while the other
"innocent" 132 shareholders would pay $61 133 of the additional $163134
tax liability created by operation of § 163(j).
This problem of imposing a tax burden on innocent bystanders may
merely be a transitional issue. The affected parties may be able to
force the corporation either to reduce the leverage or to transfer own-
ership interests in the corporate debt to unrelated persons.13 5 In some
cases they may achieve a combination of these antidotes. In any
event, a transfer of the debt to unrelated persons undoubtedly
127 The interest disallowed as a deduction is the lesser of the amount of "disqualified
interest," which in this case is $1200, and the "excess interest" of $500. See I.R.C.
§ 163(j)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
128 .34 x $1500 = $510.
129 $1000 - $510 = $490. This is the proper calculation because all but $1000 will have been
distributed as interest.
130 .60 x $490 = $294.
131 $1596 (total after-tax receipts of the year before enactment of § 163(j)) - $1494(receipts
after enactment) = $102.
132 The unrelated shareholders of Mueller are "innocent" because there is no more reason to
believe that they profited from N.Y.U.'s tax exemption than to believe that Mueller Macaroni
directly profited from N.Y.U.'s tax exemption after enactment of the UBIT. To escape both
regular corporate tax and the UBIT, Mueller's profits had to be distributed to the tax-exempt
shareholder, N.Y.U. The tax benefit-that is, the tax exemption-followed from the
treatment of this income in N.Y.U.'s hands, not Mueller's. Though N.Y.U. could reinvest this
tax-favored money in Mueller, no reason exists for it to do so in a manner directly benefiting
other Mueller shareholders-not when N.Y.U. could obtain all the benefits itself through
exchanging the additional sums for additional share or debt instruments of Mueller.
Moreover, N.Y.U. has another, equally attractive option for investment of its money: it could
invest its tax favored gains in other, unrelated companies, perhaps even as a portfolio investor.
It would again enjoy the entirety of the tax benefit allowed with respect to the resulting
income. Indeed, N.Y.U. would certainly follow this latter course if it had to share the benefits
of its additional investments in Mueller with unrelated shareholders-unless Mueller, tax
benefits aside, is super-profitable.
133 $765 - $704 = $61.
134 (.34 x $500) (additional taxes paid by Mueller) - (.34 x (.70 x $68)) (decrease in dividend
taxes paid by taxable shareholders on account of their reduced dividend) = $163.
135 An additional response may be for the tax-exempt entities to restructure the interest
obligations as royalties or rents, neither of which are covered by § 163(j). Presumably, if this
became a widely-used escape, Congress would amend § 163(j) to function like § 512(b)(13)
and include all three categories of payments. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (1988).
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increases business risks, 13 6 which in turn may compel a decline in lev-
erage in an effort to bring those risks down to a more acceptable level.
Only such a reduction in leverage necessarily increases tax revenues.
The effect of transferring the debt interests to unrelated persons
depends on whether the unrelated purchasers of the debt are taxable
or tax-favored entities. 137 If N.Y.U. sells its debtholdings in Mueller
to Columbia University, for example, the interest on those bonds will
continue to be both deductible to Mueller, eliminating its corporate
tax liability, and nontaxable in the hands of the recipient (Columbia).
The mismatch will remain.
Though tax revenues may not increase, the behavioral effects of
§ 163(j) may still prove advantageous for the same reasons that the
UBIT is advantageous. The recent interest deduction disallowance,
like the 1969 reforms, should reinforce the channeling effect of the
UBIT by forcing an even wider dispersion of equity and debt interests
in active businesses. Penalizing tax-exempt entities for owning both
share and debt holdings in a single entity encourages them to diversify
their holdings, resulting in a reduction of their control over each
entity in which they invest. N.Y.U.'s control over Mueller would be
weakened if Columbia held all of Mueller's debt. This dispersion of
control may lead to third-party control, and this third party might be
skilled in managing pasta rather than students. Such a result will not
raise additional revenue for the government, nor will it advance the
matching theme, but the change in control may lead to a better man-
aged, and more competitive, firm.
Its advantages, however, would have to be compared to the disad-
vantages of increased business risk created by such diversification of
interests. This same beneficial result could be achieved without run-
ning the risk of injuring innocent bystanders even temporarily by
expanding the UBIT to cover interest payments received by related,
highly leveraged entities. Any tax-exempt entity with enough shares
136 Both the risk of default and the risks associated with the occurrence of default-strategic
game-playing and its inevitable transactions costs-increase as the debtholders' interests
diverge from those of the shareholders. Obviously, those interests are more likely to diverge
when the shareholders and debtholders are different persons than when they are the same. The
belief that debt levels are higher when the lenders and debtor are related is undoubtedly behind
the earnings-stripping provisions as currently structured. However, the legislation affects
much more than just this "higher" amount.
137 Section 163(j) has no effect on the deduction allowed for interest payments to unrelated
creditors, no matter how highly leveraged the interest payor is.
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to fall within the definition of "related" would surely have access to
the financial records of the business necessary to determine if the
required degree of leverage existed.
Congress may, however, have intended not the dispersal of owner-
ship of businesses but the raising of revenue by way of a reduction in
the tax benefits provided to tax-exempt entities. If so, it is likely to be
disappointed by the limited effects of these statutory changes. In
order to raise revenue, Congress will have to go much further and
amend the Code to levy UBIT on all interest, rents, and royalties paid
to tax-exempt entities out of unrelated business income, regardless of
whether there is a relationship between the payor and payee. Once it
has done so, Congress will have to come to grips with the remaining
impact of the deduction for charitable contributions contained in
§ 170.
If Congress makes all passive income of tax-exempts taxable as
unrelated business income, the only way such entities will be able to
receive unrelated business income tax free is through contemporane-
ous donations. Only in that situation will the profitable mismatch
continue to exist. One profound effect of such a policy may be that
tax-exempt entities will learn to emphasize yearly donations rather
than contributions to endowments. The effects of such a change are
difficult to predict or evaluate in normative terms,138 but they surely
would be significant.
In short, a Code that is true to the matching principle could have
profound consequences for the structure and size of tax-exempt enti-
ties. On its own, however, § 163(j)'s limitation on interest deductions
will not have any more of an impact than did the 1969 reforms
because, once again, the problem is not the interest deduction. It is,
rather, the specifics of the tax-favored status of certain taxpayers.
III. THE MATCHING PRINCIPLE AND INDIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS
TO CHARITY
The allowance of a deduction for charitable contributions necessar-
ily creates mismatches because such deductions are "matched" by
income inclusions that, due to the identity of the recipient, are not
138 This is particularly true in view of the fact that the reasons charitable entities maintain
endowments is somewhat mysterious. See Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have
Endowments?, 19 J. Legal Stud. 3 (1990).
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recognized by the tax system. These mismatches provide yet another
congressional subsidy for qualifying organizations. As explained
below in Part III.A., the boundaries of this mismatch must be policed
to ensure that only qualified parties take advantage of it. Part III.B.
examines a recent case that represents an attempt to do just that,
Davis v. United States.13 9 As explained in that Part, though the Court
eventually arrived at the correct decision in the case, the Court
seemed to do so out of an irrational objection to the mismatches
themselves although these occur quite legitimately every day. In the
process, it all but avoided discussing what should have been the cen-
tral feature of the case. Part III.C. examines this issue-the benefits
of intermediary control over charitable contributions-in detail before
concluding that the outcome of the Davis case was indeed correct.
A. Self-Interested Charitable Contributions
The tax exemption provided to not-for-profit entities can also vio-
late the matching principle by allowing consumption transactions to
be taxed in accordance with the more favorable pattern that is gener-
ally reserved for business transactions. Because many of the con-
sumption items provided by tax-exempt entities are regularly
purchased on the private market with after-tax funds, it should come
as no surprise that taxpayers sometimes misuse tax-exempt entities to
obtain desired consumption items with pre-tax funds.
For example, instead of paying higher tuition to a private school,
parents of students might periodically "donate" sums to meet
"extraordinary" expenses incurred by the school."' Similarly, a tax-
payer might contribute funds to be used to aid designated needy per-
sons in the community-one of whom happens to be a retired
domestic employee of the taxpayer and whom the taxpayer would
otherwise feel morally obliged to assist.' 41 Moreover, donors may
139 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
140 This ploy does not always work. See, e.g., Fausner v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 55 T.C. 620, 624 (1971) (holding that payments to parochial schools attended by
taxpayer's children are not "acts of detached and disinterested generosity"), separate holding
afl'd., 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.), af'd., 413 U.S. 838 (1973); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d
778, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding the same); Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108.
141 Again, the taxpayer who tries to do this may be challenged by the Service. However, at
least one such taxpayer has prevailed in federal court. See Havemeyer v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 98 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that contributions to association for the
benefit of elderly family retainers are deductible).
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seek to influence operational decisions of a tax-exempt entity so that
those operations fulfill the needs of the entity as well as pecuniary
demands that would otherwise be imposed on the donor. A donor
may try to donate money for an additional staff position on the condi-
tion that some unemployed relative be hired to fill it. It is equally
unsurprising that tax law attempts to block such maneuvers. Con-
gress is willing to give financial benefits to reward altruistic behavior
that might otherwise be undersupplied, but it has no intention of
granting tax benefits to reward essentially selfish behavior.14 2
One way in which Congress has attempted to foil taxpayer plots
designed to exploit the charitable deduction143 has been to require
that donations be made to registered charitable entities rather than to
individual recipients of charitable beneficence or to defray particular
expenses incurred by the organization. 144 This requirement utilizes
142 See H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B.
728, 742:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other
purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of
revenue by its relief from financial burden that would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of
the general welfare.
If a taxpayer would have made the transfer in any case as a result of private considerations, no
financial burden on the Government would have existed to be relieved, and the justification for
the tax deduction disappears. See also 61 Cong. Rec. 5294 (1921) (statement of Rep. Green)
("The gifts must be made exclusively for public purposes."); Thomason v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 2 T.C. 441, 443-44 (1943) ("Charity begins where certainty in beneficiaries
ends .... Whenever the beneficiary is designated by name and his merit alone is to be consid-
ered, the bequest is private and not public and ceases to have the peculiar merit of a charity.").
143 This term refers to the deduction allowed by § 170 of the Code. Technically, § 170
allows deductions for contributions to states, political subdivisions of states, or the federal
government "for exclusively public purposes," organizations "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes," veterans'
organizations, and certain cemetery organizations. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988).
144 See id. (providing that "the term 'charitable contribution' means a contribution or gift to
or for the use of" qualified organizations). The regulations back up this statutory command
by requiring donors to maintain written records, which may be required to be attached to the
donor's income tax returns, detailing:
The terms of any agreement or understanding entered into by or on behalf of the
taxpayer which relates to the use, sale, or other disposition of the property contributed,
including for example, the terms of any agreement or understanding which-
(1) Restricts temporarily or permanently the donee's right to use or dispose of
the donated property,
(2) Reserves to, or confers upon, anyone (other than the donee organization or
an organization participating with the donee organization in cooperative
fundraising) any right to the income from the donated property or to the
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the entities as monitors.'45 The necessity of the interposition of the
charitable entity between donor and eventual recipient was recently
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Davis v. United States.1" The
Court did so, however, for reasons that are at best misleading and at
worst wrong. Though the erroneous reasoning did not prevent the
Court from reaching the right result in the Davis case, similar errors
might have harmful consequences in the future.
B. Davis and Indirect Charitable Payments
In Davis, the Supreme Court resolved an intercircuit dispute
regarding the deductibility of payments made by Mormon 47 parents
to support their children during a term of missionary service.'48 The
possession of the property, including the right to vote donated securities, to
acquire the property by purchase or otherwise, or to designate the person having
such income, possession, or right to acquire, or
(3) Earmarks donated property for a particular use.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(b)(2)(ii)(G) (as amended in 1990). Thus, should a donor try to
earmark a contribution to be used to hire a hapless relative or support an indigent former
employee of the donor, this condition would have to be disclosed. Such disclosure would pre-
sumably lead to the disallowance of the deduction. See also Dohrmann v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 18 B.T.A. 66 (1929) (deciding that gifts to needy persons are not deductible
in the absence of an organized charitable institution); Kluss v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 46 T.C. 572 (1966) (disallowing donation to nonexempt foundation even though it
financed work that benefited exempt charities); Rev. Rul. 80-77, 1980-1 C.B. 56 (allowing
deduction for donations to the Red Cross, the local volunteer fire department, the Girl Scouts,
and a home for the elderly by recipients of benefits from such organizations as long as no
explicit tie exists between donation and receipt of benefits).
145 The Supreme Court explained the monitoring phenomenon in Davis v. United States:
A qualified beneficiary of a bona fide trust for charitable purposes would have both the
incentive and legal authority to ensure that donated funds are properly used. If the
trust contributes funds to a range of charitable organizations so that no single
beneficiary could enforce its terms, the trustee's duty can be enforced by the Attorney
General under the laws of most States.
495 U.S. 472, 483 (1990); see also Wendy G. Shaller, Tax Exemption of Charitable Organiza-
tions and the Deductibility of Charitable Donations: Dangerous New Tests, 8 U. Bridgeport L.
Rev. 77, 95 (1987) ("Because a qualified donee is already under scrutiny by the I.R.S., there is
a greater likelihood that funds disbursed by these organizations will be used for exempt
purposes.").
146 495 U.S. 472 (1990).
147 This is the name commonly attached to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
and its members.
148 In the first case to reach this issue, White v. United States, 725 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir.
1984), the Tenth Circuit allowed parents to deduct their payment of travel and living expenses
for their missionary son. Two years later, in Brinley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that
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Mormon Church operates a worldwide missionary program involving
25,000 persons each year, most of whom are young men between the
ages of nineteen and twenty-two. 149 Under Mormon doctrine, mor-
ally worthy members of the Church are generally "called" to serve as
missionaries when they reach the age of nineteen or twenty.15 While
on their mission, missionaries devote all their energies to fulfilling
their missionary responsibilities.151 Financial support during the mis-
sion period is provided, whenever possible, by each missionary's own
parents.1 52 The amount of such support is determined, however, by
the Church's Missionary Department. 53 The Davis family had two
sons who served as missionaries during the taxable years at issue in
the case. The question presented in the case was whether the parents
taxpayers' payments sustaining their son while serving on a mission would be deductible if the
Church were the primary beneficiary of the expenditure, see id. at 1331, or the Church
maintained control over the expenditure by directing its amount and object. See id. at 1335. It
then remanded the case to the Tax Court to allow the taxpayers the opportunity to present
evidence of such use and control. Id. at 1336. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held in Davis v.
United States, 861 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd., 495 U.S. 472 (1990), that amounts paid by
taxpayers into their sons' bank accounts to support them while serving as missionaries would
not constitute charitable contributions absent evidence that the Church controlled the
disposition of the funds in the bank account. Id. at 562.
149 Davis, 495 U.S. at 474.
150 To be "called" is both a responsibility and a privilege. Before "calling" an individual,
Church authorities must verify that the member has demonstrated adherence to the faith and
doctrines of the religion by observing its standards and commandments, see Brinley, 782 F.2d
at 1328, and is otherwise "spiritually, physically, and emotionally fit for missionary service."
K.C. Jensen, Note, Tax Deductions for Payments to Mormon Missionaries, 4 B.Y.U. J. Pub.
L. 115, 115 (1990).
151 During the missionary service, the mission president (leader of the mission) controls
many aspects of the missionaries' lives, including the manner of dress and grooming.
Missionaries are required to conform to a daily schedule which calls for at least 10
hours per day of actual missionary work in addition to study time, mealtime, and
planning time. Mission rules forbid dating, movies, plays, certain sports, and other
activities; missionaries are not allowed to take vacations or travel for personal purposes.
Davis, 495 U.S. at 474-75.
152 If the parents are unable or unwilling, as may be the case if the parents are not
themselves members of the Church, to provide the necessary funds, the Church tries to locate
another donor from the local congregation. As a last resort, it uses money donated to the
Church's general missionary funds. Id. at 474. The Church relies on direct contributions to
missionaries by specified individuals both because it " 'fosters the Church doctrine of sacrifice
and consecration in the lives of its people" and because it reduces the administrative and
bookkeeping requirements that would otherwise be imposed on the Church. Id. Further,
"direct payments encourage frugality because the missionary is aware of the personal sacrifice
by specific persons to assist the missionary work." White, 725 F.2d at 1270.
153 Davis, 495 U.S. at 474.
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were entitled to take a charitable deduction for the amounts they sent
their children, in accordance with the Church's instructions, to sup-
port them in their missionary work. 154
Much of the case revolved around-and indeed, the eventual reso-
lution of the case depended on-the correct interpretation of § 170's
statutory language. In particular, the controversy centered on the lit-
eral meaning of the phrase "or for the use of" in the clause "the term
'charitable contribution' means a contribution or gift to or for the use
of-. . . (2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foun-
dation-. . . organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes
....*"155 The taxpayers argued that the statutory language should be
interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, so that any payments
made that benefited the Church and furthered its activities, including
the payments taxpayers made to support their sons' missionary serv-
ices, should be considered charitable contributions "for the use of"
the Church. 156
The government argued and the Supreme Court held that the
clause "for the use of" conveyed "a similar meaning as 'in trust
for,' "157 an interpretation that the Court found to be consonant with
the traditions of the English common law 15 8 and the legislative history
of the amendment to § 170.159 Because the taxpayers gave the money
directly to their sons without imposing any legal restrictions on the
154 The Davises did not seek a deduction for amounts transferred in excess of the sums
requested by the Church. See Brief of Petitioners at 6, Davis (No. 89-98) ("The charitable
contribution deductions at issue in this case did not exceed the amounts set by the Church.");
Davis v. United States, 861 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that taxpayers' second
amended return reduced charitable deduction claimed to the "amount... requested by the
Church").
155 See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988); Davis, 495 U.S. at 478. The taxpayers argued in the
alternative that the payments were deductible under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (as amended in
1990), which allows the deduction of "unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the
rendition of services to an organization contributions to which are deductible." Id.
156 Davis, 495 U.S. at 479.
157 Id. at 480-81.
158 From the dawn of English common law through the present, the word "use" has been
employed to refer to various forms of trust arrangements. See 1 G. Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 2, p. 9 (1935); Black's Law Dictionary 1382 (5th ed. 1979) ("Uses and trusts
are not so much different things as different aspects of the same subject. A use regards
principally the beneficial interest; a trust regards principally the nominal ownership").
In the early part of this century, the word "use" was technically employed to refer to a
passive trust, but less formally used as a synonym for the word "trust."
Id. at 481.
159 See id.
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sons' use of the funds, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayers had
not donated the funds in trust for the Church and, hence, had not
donated the funds "'for the use of' the Church for purposes of
§ 170."' 60
The Court made clear that policy considerations fueled this legal
decision. Conceding at several points in the opinion that the taxpay-
ers' interpretation of the statute was plausible,161 it expressed concern
that "petitioners' interpretation would create an opportunity for tax
evasion that others might be eager to exploit."' 162 Following the gov-
ernment's lead, the Court seemed particularly concerned about the
difficulty of auditing and controlling deductions involving payments
to specific individuals, particularly family members. 63 Both the
Court and the government in its brief seemed convinced that the only
way to justify a deduction for a payment to an individual missionary
was to show that the individual expended all the money received on
Church expenses, thus necessitating an audit of the recipient's
expenditures to determine the correctness of the donation.
That concern seems misplaced. Even a donor's support of a mis-
sionary's personal expenses is of value to the Church, because such
support relieves the Church of the necessity of paying that missionary
a salary. 164 Payments to a missionary are analogous to a donor's
direct payment of the salary of a professor, rather than donating the
money to the college that pays the salary. As long as the professor
treats the sum as salary for tax purposes there is no particular reason
to inquire into the professor's expenditures. Indeed, one expects that
the bulk of the professor's expenditures will be for personal, consump-
tion items.
Put differently, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner1 65 decided
that an employer's payment of taxes directly to the federal govern-
ment on behalf of an employee was constructive salary to the
employee rather than a gift excludable from income under § 102 of
160 Id. at 485-86.
161 See id. at 479, 484.
162 Id. at 485.
163 Id.
164 This assumes, of course, that the Church takes the donations into account when deciding
the missionary's salary. Such account can only be taken if the Church is aware of the
donation.
165 279 U.S. 716 (U.S. 1929).
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the Code. The professor is thus on safe ground when the payment is
reported as salary. The only fact that needs to be determined on audit
is whether the payee actually rendered services on behalf of the col-
lege-or, in the case of the missionaries, the Church-a determination
that would be required to be made if the payments were made directly
by the tax-exempt organization as well.
The Court also expressed concern that "[p]arents and children
might attempt to claim a deduction for the same expenditure"
because the sums donated and deducted by the parents might be used
by a missionary child to buy religious tracts for distribution, for
example, for which the child would also claim a charitable deduc-
tion.166 But the same double deduction treatment results when the
Church steps in and functions as an intermediary. The parents enjoy
a deduction for the contribution to the Church and the son includes
the salary received from the Church, but this inclusion is partly offset
by deductions for expenditures on religious items to be distributed,
assuming the missionary itemizes deductions. Alternatively, the
Church may pay the missionary a lower salary and then offer reim-
bursement for any expenditures incurred for religious items. Thus,
the mismatch identified by the Court as the end of a "parade of hor-
ribles" is no disaster at all but merely represents the normal operation
of the tax-exemption provided to religious/charitable organizations
and activities.
C. The Benefits of Intermediary Control
Although the mismatches identified by the Court are not necessar-
ily abusive, the intuition that the donative pattern at issue invited
abuse was quite correct. The problem is not in the mismatch but in
the process used for deciding which expenditures qualify for the
favorable mismatch. There is little question that putting money
directly in the hands of beneficiaries or "employees" substantially
reduces the control exercised by the tax-exempt intermediaries that
organize charitable fundraising and activities.16 7 At the very least,
such direct transmissions give donors greater control over the receipt
of benefits. Leaving such decisions in a donor's hands unquestionably
166 See Davis, 495 U.S. at 488.
167 See Note, Does Charity Begin at Home? The Tax Status of a Payment to an Individual
as a Charitable Deduction, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1428, 1442-43 (1985).
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opens the way for abusive behavior. Although the Davis brothers
may not have taken advantage of the lack of control by an independ-
ent intermediary, 168 the Court can hardly be faulted for refusing to set
a dangerous precedent.
Even as the Court insists on the interposition of a tax-exempt entity
between the charitable donor and the eventual beneficiaries, there
remain several other methods of enjoying a charitable deduction yet
avoiding the oversight of an intermediary tax-exempt entity. One is
the allowance, by Treasury regulation, of charitable deductions for
"unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of serv-
ices to an organization contributions to which are deductible." 169 For
example, a volunteer who spends a night away from home in the ser-
vice of a charity may choose to stay in a luxury hotel for the night
rather than a budget motel without having to answer to the charity
(or imperiling her deduction for the cost of the hotel). 170
The other method of avoiding the oversight of the intermediary is
the allowance of deductions for contributions of property to a quali-
fied charity, including recently purchased property. A taxpayer may
claim a deduction for the full cost of specially made prayer books
bound at her brother's struggling bindery and then donated to a local
church. Such a donation fills two goals, only one of which justifies the
claimed deduction. In both of these situations, it is the taxpayer who
claims the deduction and makes all decisions regarding the purchase,
not the tax-exempt entity.1 71 Such purchases can be made from
168 One cannot say the same for the Davis parents. They initially sought to deduct the
entirety of the amounts sent to their sons and did not reduce their deduction to the amounts
requested by the Church until filing their second amended return. See Brief of Petitioners,
supra note 154, at 6-7. Though the case presented only the question of the deductibility of the
amounts requested by the Church, the Court might well have have noted the taxpayers'
tendency to overfund their son's efforts (at partial government expense) in the absence of
intermediary control.
169 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (as amended in 1990).
170 Because the value of the deduction only partially offsets the cost of the differential
between hotel and camping prices, the volunteer must fund part of it herself. Nonetheless, the
deduction lessens the differential, making the choice a closer one than it would have been had
the volunteer been responsible for the entirety of her expenses.
171 Such decisions include the price to be paid for the item and the identity of the supplier.
The price decision is limited by a "fair market value" standard, particularly when a donation
of property is involved. The substantiation requirements demanded by the Service increase
along with the value of the property donated. See Treas. Reg. § 1.70A-13(b) to -13(c) (as
amended in 1990) (describing information required, including "qualified appraisal" for
donations of property valued in excess of $5000).
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friends or relatives and can be tailored to fit the personal tastes of the
purchaser, rather than the best interests of the tax-exempt organiza-
tion. The questions then become whether those methods somehow
avoid the dangers posed by the situation at issue in Davis and, if not,
how those methods could be subjected to similar restrictions.
One safeguard that exists in these situations, but not in Davis, is
that it would be quite difficult for all of the donor's contribution to be
diverted to private benefit. To qualify for the deduction of
unreimbursed expenses, the donor must provide some services,' 72 the
provision of which necessarily exacts a personal toll on the pro-
vider. 73 Some of these costs must be for the property itself-such as
paper, ink, and leather in the case of donated prayerbooks-and these
will not enrich the person providing services. The existence of these
extraneous costs limits abuse possibilities by making them less valua-
ble; the personal costs imposed by the required transactions decrease
the net gain from personally beneficial transfers. Looking at the prob-
lem in another way that is consistent with this Article's general
theme, one could argue that a mismatch exists between the donor's
personal expenditures and personal benefits. The greater the mis-
match that exists, the more comfortable we should be with allowing a
deduction for the expenditures involved.
I do not mean to suggest that no potential for abuse remains. If
only a small amount of the donation is "misdirected," so that no per-
sonal benefit is generated, one has to wonder if the donation is moti-
vated more by personal or private interests. If, for example, the donor
donates a wooden pew, hand-carved by his aspiring artist-child, one
wonders whether the major beneficiary is the parent who receives a
tax deduction for what would otherwise be a nondeductible support
payment or the church receiving the pew. 174 Similarly, an overnight
trip on behalf of a charity probably does not justify the deduction of
172 The Supreme Court in Davis rejected the taxpayers' argument that they should be
entitled to deduct the unreimbursed expenses of their sons, concluding that "§ 1.170A-l(g)
does not allow taxpayers to claim a deduction for expenses not incurred in connection with the
taxpayers' own rendition of services to a qualified organization." 495 U.S. at 488.
173 This toll need not be immense, however. See, e.g., McCollum v. Commissioner, T.C.M.
(P-H) % 78,435 (1978) (holding that expenses incurred during voluntary services to National
Ski Patrol deductible, even though taxpayer enjoyed skiing).
174 Some control on this sort of misbehavior will be exercised by the limitation on the
amount of the deduction to the fair market value of the property donated. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-l(c)(1) (as amended in 1990); 2 Bittker, supra note 4, 35.2.1.
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the costs of the most expensive hotel room and meal in New York
City. Some rule of proportionality between costs and benefits is
needed. In fact, such a test is applied in the context of unreimbursed
expenses, though it is usually denominated under the rubric of the
"primary beneficiary" test. 175 That is, the court must agree that the
"primary beneficiary" of the unreimbursed expense is the charity,
rather than the supplier or consumer of the expenditure, or the deduc-
tion will be disallowed.
Needless to say, the determination of the primary beneficiary can
be a difficult factual question, resulting in decisions of little preceden-
tial value. For example, in Hamilton v. Commissioner,176 the Tax
Court found that costs incurred by the taxpayer in transporting chil-
dren to Girl Scout activities was nondeductible because the "primary
beneficiaries" were the children transported, not the organization. 177
However, the children transported happened to be the taxpayer's own
"and sometimes other children." 178 One wonders whether the Tax
Court would have reached a different decision if the taxpayer had
hired a bus at his expense and driven ten unrelated children as well as
one of his own to a jamboree.
Moreover, in a set of other, superficially similar circumstances,
even the imposition of a proportionality test seems questionable. For
example, in the typical scenario involving a charity ball or benefit per-
formance to which overpriced tickets are sold, one of the volunteer
organizers may pay for the entertainment or catering out of his or her
own pocket. This presents no matching problem if the purchasers of
these tickets carefully deduct only the excess of the ticket price over
the value of attending the event, a value that presumably has some
relationship to the costs of staging it. 179 Thus, such expenditures are
175 Deductions are denied for service-related expenses where it is clear that the primary
beneficiary of the services or expenditures is not the charitable organization but the taxpayer or
another person. See Note, supra note 167, at 1432 n.23, 1433-34 & n.35 (listing cases denying
such deductions).
176 T.C.M. (P-H) V 79,186 (1979).
177 Id. at 740.
178 Id.
179 The Service issued a revenue ruling that limits deductions to the excess of the purchase
price over the fair market value of attending the fund-raising event. See Rev. Rul. 67-246,
1967-2 C.B. 104. Presumably, in the absence of information about fair market value, a donor-
attendee may use cost as a proxy for fair market value. When the fair market value exceeds
the donor-provider's cost, there is a slight mismatch between the treatment of the provider and
the attendee. This mismatch is not troubling because the inability of the attendee to claim a
1993] 859
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taxed twice, in accordance with the consumption model. The only
mismatch that may exist is the partial one arising out of the fact that
the attendees, rather than the donor, include the costs in income. But
even this problem is minor because the purchasers themselves tend to
be in the same tax bracket as the donors, especially in light of contem-
porary, flat tax rates. Moreover, donors will find it hard to sell tickets
if they fail to provide attendees with value for the nondeductible por-
tion of the ticket price. In short, the market, as well as the tax-
exempt entity, can act as a monitor in these situations.
The importance of policing access to the favorable pattern of taxa-
tion allowed tax-exempt entities is easily underestimated. The Davis
decision should help the Service perform this necessary function by
adding to its arsenal of monitoring devices. But the need for such
monitoring should not be confused with an evaluation of the underly-
ing tax advantage. The matching principle is in part a tool with
which to identify areas of tax law that require careful study. In this
case, the principle has allowed us to see that the tax exemption
enjoyed by nonprofit organizations is a valuable creature with subtle
effects and debatable attributes.
CONCLUSION
One of the hardest tasks in the implementation of the "real" tax
benefit rule is determining its limits. Not all "inconsistencies" in
treatment between taxable years require the reconciliation or correc-
tion that the familiar tax benefit rule suggests. Some apparent mis-
matches, when viewed in the context of the entire statutory scheme,
turn out to be manifestations of purposeful legislative decisions. 180
deduction is offset by the failure of the charity or the provider to recognize gain on the value
added, or the excess of market value over cost.
180 See, e.g., Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 391-95 (1983)
(refusing to apply the tax benefit rule to refunds of property tax paid directly to shareholders);
Rojas v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1090, 1108-09 (1988), aff'd 901 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to apply the tax benefit rule to corporate liquidation of appreciated assets); Rev. Rul.
85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84 (deciding that the tax benefit rule does not require the recapture of
previously deducted research and development costs upon the sale of an invention). See
generally Louis A. Del Cotto & Kenneth F. Joyce, Double Benefits and Transactional
Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 Tax L. Rev. 473, 478-95 (1984) (asserting that
proper question to be asked in each case is "whether the allowance of the second benefit is...
'fundamentally inconsistent' with the allowance of the first benefit"); Carolyn Ells Cheverine,
Note, Rojas v. Commissioner: How Far Should The Tax Benefit Rule Go?, 9 Va. Tax Rev. 173
[Vol. 79:813
HeinOnline  -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  860 1993
The Matching Pr'nciple
The same is true of the "systemic tax benefit rule," or matching prin-
ciple, described in this Article. All taxpayers are not treated equally;
Congress has determined that some should be treated more favorably
than others. It is therefore not surprising that deviations from "nor-
mal" patterns of taxation appear. Nevertheless, unqualified accept-
ance of such deviations threatens the revenue-raising capacity of the
income tax system. I have tried to show that a systemic analysis is
required in order to assess the acceptability of deviations from the
norm. Narrower analysis tends to lead to "reforms" that are ineffec-
tive if not largely counterproductive. In the end, much as the familiar
tax benefit rule is less a rule than a useful tool for exploring realization
and other inclusionary aspects of our tax system, the matching princi-
ple provides a useful means of thinking about deductions, exemptions,
and their systemic effects.
(1989) (arguing that the tax benefit rule has been properly ruled inapplicable when expensed
materials are fully consumed before liquidation).
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